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Abstract
Residential segregation is a wide-spread phenomenon that can be observed in almost every
major city. In these urban areas residents with different racial or socioeconomic background
tend to form homogeneous clusters. Schelling’s famous agent-based model for residential
segregation explains how such clusters can form even if all agents are tolerant, i.e., if they
agree to live in mixed neighborhoods. For segregation to occur, all it needs is a slight
bias towards agents preferring similar neighbors. Very recently, Schelling’s model has been
investigated from a game-theoretic point of view with selfish agents that strategically select
their residential location. In these games, agents can improve on their current location by
performing a location swap with another agent who is willing to swap.
We significantly deepen these investigations by studying the influence of the underlying
topology modeling the residential area on the existence of equilibria, the Price of Anarchy
and on the dynamic properties of the resulting strategic multi-agent system. Moreover, as
a new conceptual contribution, we also consider the influence of locality, i.e., if the location
swaps are restricted to swaps of neighboring agents. We give improved almost tight bounds
on the Price of Anarchy for arbitrary underlying graphs and we present (almost) tight bounds
for regular graphs, paths and cycles. Moreover, we give almost tight bounds for grids, which
are commonly used in empirical studies. For grids we also show that locality has a severe
impact on the game dynamics.
1 Introduction
Today’s metropolitan areas are populated by a diverse set of residential groups which differ along
ethnical, socioeconomic and other traits. A common finding is that cityscapes are not well-
mixed, i.e., the different groups of agents tend to separate themselves into largely homogeneous
neighborhoods1. This phenomenon is well-known as residential segregation and is a subject
of study in sociology, mathematics and computer science for at least five decades. The most
important scientific model addressing residential segregation was proposed by Schelling [28,
29] who simply considered two types of residential agents who are located on a line or on a
checkerboard. Each agent is aware of the agents in her neighborhood and is content with her
location, if and only if the fraction of neighbors being of her own type is above the tolerance
parameter τ , for some 0 < τ ≤ 1. Discontent agents simply move to another location. Using this
basic model Schelling showed that starting from an initially mixed state over time segregated
neighborhoods will emerge. While this is to be expected for high τ , Schelling’s finding was that
this also happens for tolerant agents, i.e., if τ ≤ 12 . Thus, only a slight bias towards favoring
similar neighbors leads to the emergence of segregation.
Schelling proposed his model as a random process. This has led to an abundance of empirical
studies that simulated this process, see, e.g., [18, 12] and the references to chapter 4 in [?]. In
these studies, the commonly used underlying topology for modeling the residential area are grid
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graphs (often toroidal grids where vertices of borders on opposite sides are identified), paths
and cycles. A recent line of work [31, 32, 33, 19, 9, 4, 6, 5, 21, 27] rigorously analyzed variants
of this random process on paths or grid graphs and it was shown that residential segregation
occurs with high probability. However, in reality agents would not move randomly, instead they
would move to a location that maximizes their utility.
To address this selfish behavior, a very recent line of work [13, 16, 15, 1] initiated the
study of residential segregation from a game-theoretic point of view. The residential area is
modeled as a multi-agent system consisting of selfish agents who occupy vertices of an underlying
graph and try to maximize their utility, which depends on the agents’ types in their immediate
neighborhood, by strategically selecting locations. Also strategic segregation in social network
formation was considered [2].
This paper sets out to significantly improve and deepen the results on game-theoretic res-
idential segregation for the model investigated in [1] which allows pairs of discontent agents
of different type to swap their locations to maximize their utility. This variant of Schelling’s
model becomes more and more realistic as in many cities the percentage of vacant housing is
below 1%. In such settings, location swaps become the only way for agents to improve on their
current housing situation. For the model in [1] we consider the influence of the given topology
that models the residential area on core game-theoretic questions like the existence of equilibria,
the Price of Anarchy and the game dynamics. We thereby focus on popularly studied topologies
like grids, paths and cycles. Moreover, we follow-up on a proposal by Schelling [29] to restrict
the movement of agents locally and we investigate the influence of this restriction. Such local
swaps are realistic since people want to stay close to their working place or important facilities
like schools. This also holds when considering dynamics where agents repeatedly perform local
moves since these dynamics can be understood as a process which happens over a long timespan
and agents adapt to their new neighborhoods over time.
1.1 Model, Definitions and Notation
We consider a strategic game played on a given underlying connected, unweighted and undirected
graph G = (V,E), with V the set of vertices and E the set of edges. We denote the cardinalities
of V and E with n and m, respectively.
For any vertex v ∈ V we denote the neighborhood of v in G as Nv = {u ∈ V : {v, u} ∈ E}
and δv = |Nv| denotes the degree of v in G. Let ∆(G) = maxv∈V δv and δ(G) = minv∈V δv be
the maximum and minimum degree of vertices in G, respectively. We call a graph G α-almost
regular if ∆(G) − δ(G) = α and we call α-almost regular graphs regular if α = 0 and almost
regular when α = 1. Grid graphs will play a prominent role. We will consider grid graphs with
4-neighbors (4-grids) which are formed by a two-dimensional lattice with l rows and h columns
and every vertex is connected to the vertex on its left, top, right and bottom, respectively, if
they exist. In grid graphs with 8-neighbors (8-grids), vertices are additionally also connected to
their top-left, top-right, bottem-left and bottom-right vertices, respectively, if they exist.
For a positive integer k, let [k] denote the set {1, . . . , k}, moreover, given a graph G = (V,E),
let Tk(G) denote the set of k-tuples of positive integers summing up to n = |V |.
A Swap Schelling Game with k types (k-SSG) (G, t) is defined by a graph G = (V,E) and
a k-tuple t = (t1, . . . , tk) ∈ Tk(G). There are n strategic agents that need to choose vertices
in V in such a way that every vertex is occupied by exactly one agent. Every agent belongs to
exactly one of the k types and there are ti agents of type i, for every i ∈ [k]. When |ti| = |tj | for
each i, j ∈ [k], we say that the game is balanced. For convenience and in all of our illustrations,
we associate each agent type i ∈ [k] with a color. When k = 2, we use colors blue and orange
and denote by b and o = n−b the number of blue and orange agents, respectively. Additionally,
in case of a game with k = 2, we will assume that o ≤ b, i.e., orange is the color of the minority
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type. For any graph G and any k-dimensional type vector t ∈ Tk(G), let c : [n] → [k] denote
the function which maps any agent i ∈ [n] to her color c(i) ∈ [k].
The strategy of an agent is her location on the graph, i.e., a vertex of G. A feasible strategy
profile σ is an n-dimensional vector whose i-th entry corresponds to the strategy of the i-th
agent and where all strategies are pairwise disjoint, i.e., σ is a permutation of V , and we will
treat σ as a bijective function mapping agents to vertices, with σ−1 being its inverse function.
Thus, any feasible strategy profile σ corresponds to a coloring of G such that for each i ∈ [k]
exactly ti vertices of G are colored with the i-th color. We say that agent i occupies vertex v
in σ if the i-th entry of σ, denoted as σ(i), is v and, equivalently, if σ−1(v) = i. It will become
important to distinguish if two agents i, j occupy neighboring vertices under σ. For this, we will
use the notation 1ij(σ) with 1ij(σ) = 1 if agents i and j occupy neighboring vertices under σ
and 1ij(σ) = 0 otherwise.
For an agent i and any feasible strategy profile σ, we denote by Ci(σ) = {v ∈ V :
c(σ−1(v)) = c(i)} the set of vertices of G which are occupied by agents having the same color
as agent i. The utility of agent i in σ is defined as Ui(σ) =
|Nσ(i)∩Ci(σ)|
δσ(i)
, i.e., as the ratio of the
number of agents with the same type which occupy neighboring vertices and the total number
of neighboring vertices, and each agent aims at maximizing her utility.
Agents can change their strategies only by swapping vertex occupation with another agent.
Consider two strategic agents i and j which occupy vertices σ(i) and σ(j), respectively. After
performing a swap both agents exchange their occupied vertex which yields a new feasible strat-
egy profile σij , which is identical to σ except that the i-th and the j-th entries are exchanged.
Thus, in the induced coloring of G, the coloring corresponding to σij is identical to the coloring
corresponding to σ except that the colors of vertices σ(i) and σ(j) are exchanged. We say that
a swap is local if the swapping agents occupy neighboring vertices, i.e., if 1ij(σ) = 1.
As agents are strategic and want to maximize their utility, we will only consider profitable
swaps by agents, i.e., swaps which strictly increase the utility of both agents involved in the
swap. It follows that profitable swaps can only occur between agents of different colors. We
call a feasible strategy profile σ a swap equilibrium, or simply, equilibrium, if σ does not admit
profitable swaps, that is, if for each pair of agents i, j, we have Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(σij) or Uj(σ) ≥
Uj(σij). We call σ a local swap equilibrium, or simply local equilibrium, if no profitable local
swap exists under σ. If agents are restricted to performing only local swaps, then we call the
corresponding strategic game Local Swap Schelling Game with k types (local k-SSG). Clearly,
any swap equilibrium σ is also a local swap equilibrium but the converse is not true. Thus the
set of local swap equilibria is a superset of the set of swap equilibria.
We measure the quality of a feasible strategy profile σ by its social welfare U(σ), which is the
sum over the utilities of all agents, i.e., U(σ) =
∑n
i=1 Ui(σ). For any game (G, t), let σ
∗(G, t)
denote a feasible strategy profile which maximizes the social welfare and let SE(G, t) and
LSE(G, t) denote the set of swap equilibria and local swap equilibria for (G, t), respectively.
We will study the impact of the agents’ selfishness on the obtained social welfare for games played
on a given class of underlying graphs G with k agent types by analyzing the Price of Anarchy
(PoA) [23], which is defined as PoA(G, k) = maxG∈G maxt∈Tk(G) U(σ
∗(G,t))
minσ∈SE(G,t) U(σ)
. Analogously,
we define the Local Price of Anarchy (LPoA) as the same ratio but with respect to local swap
equilibria. It follows that, for any k ≥ 2 and class of graphs G, we have PoA(G, k) ≤ LPoA(G, k).
We will also investigate the dynamic properties of the (local) k-SSG, i.e., we analyze if the
game has the finite improvement property (FIP) [26]. In our model, a game possesses the FIP
if every sequence of profitable (local) swaps is finite. This is equivalent to the existence of
an ordinal potential function which guarantees that sequences of profitable (local) swaps will
converge to a (local) swap equilibrium of the game. The FIP can be disproved by showing the
existence of an improving response cycle (IRC), which is a sequence of feasible strategy profiles
σ0,σ1, . . . ,σ`, with σ` = σ0, where σq+1 is obtained by a profitable swap by two agents in σq,
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for q ∈ [` − 1]. For investigating the FIP, the following function Φ mapping feasible strategy
profiles to natural numbers will be important: Φ(σ) =
∣∣{{u, v} ∈ E | c(σ−1(u)) = c(σ−1(v))}∣∣ .
Hence, Φ(σ) is the number of edges of G whose endpoints are occupied by agents of the same
color under the feasible strategy profile σ. We will denote such edges as monochromatic edges
and Φ(σ) as the potential of σ. We will see that potential-preserving profitable swaps exist.
For analyzing such swaps, we will consider the extendend potential Ψ(σ) which essentially is
Φ(σ) augmented with a tie-breaker. It is defined as Ψ(σ) = (Φ(σ), n − z(σ)), where z(σ) is
the number of agents having utility 0 under σ. We compare Ψ for different strategy profiles
σ and σ′ lexicographically, i.e., on the one hand we have Ψ(σ) > Ψ(σ′) if Φ(σ) > Φ(σ′) or
Φ(σ) = Φ(σ′) and z(σ) < z(σ′). On the other hand we have Ψ(σ) < Ψ(σ′) if Φ(σ) < Φ(σ′) or
Φ(σ) = Φ(σ′) and z(σ) > z(σ′). Note that any profitable swap which increases (decreases) the
potential Φ also increases (decreases) the extended potential Ψ.
1.2 Related Work
We focus on related work on game-theoretic segregation models.
Zhang [32, 33] was the first who introduced a game-theoretic model related to Schelling’s
original model. There, agents having a noisy single peaked utility function and preferring to
be in a balanced neighborhood were employed. Later, Chauhan et al. [13] introduced a game-
theoretic model which is much closer to Schelling’s formulation. In their model there are two
types of agents and the utility of an agent depends on the type ratio in her neighborhood. An
agent is content if the fraction of own-type neighbors is above τ ∈ (0, 1]. Additionally, agents
may have a preferred location. To improve their utility, agents can either swap with another
agent who is willing to swap (Swap Schelling Game) or jump to an unoccupied vertex (Jump
Schelling Game). Their main contribution is an investigation of the convergence properties of
many variants of the model. Moreover they provide basic properties of stable placements and
their efficiency. Echzell et al. [15] strengthen these results but omitted location preferences.
Instead they extended the model to more than two agent types and studied the computational
hardness of finding optimal placements. Elkind et al. [16] investigated a similar model with k
types where agents are either strategic or stubborn. Only strategic agents are willing to move and
strive for maximizing the fraction of own-type neighbors by jumping to a suitable unoccupied
location. This corresponds to the jump version of Chauhan et al. [13] with τ = 1. They
show that equilibria are not guaranteed to exist, they analyze the complexity of finding optimal
placements and they prove that the PoA can be unbounded. Very recently, Agarwal et al. [1]
considered swap games in the model of Elkind et al. [16]. They show that on underlying trees
equilibria may not exist and that deciding equilibrium existence and the existence of a state
with at least a given social welfare is NP-hard. They also establish that the PoA is in Θ(n) on
underlying star graphs if there are at least two agents of each type and between 2.0558 and 4 for
balanced games on any graph. Moreover, for k ≥ 3 the PoA can be unbounded even in balanced
games. Additionally, they give a constant lower bound on the Price of Stability and show that
it equals 1 on regular graphs. Finally, they introduce a new benchmark for measuring diversity
by counting the number of agents having at least one neighbor of different type. In the present
paper, we focus on this very recent model by Agarwal et al. [1] and extend and improve their
PoA results.
Hedonic games [14, 8] are related to Schelling games. In particular, Schelling games share a
number of properties with fractional hedonic games [7, 24, 3, 11, 25], hedonic diversity games [10]
and FEN-hedonic games [20, 17, 22]. However, one of the main differences is that in Schelling
games the neighborhoods of coalitions overlap while in hedonic games agents form disjoint
coalitions with identical neighborhoods for all agents within the same coalition.
Investigating a local variant of Schelling’s model, although proposed by Schelling [29] himself,
seems to be a novel approach. To the best of our knowledge, local moves have only been ad-
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dressed briefly by Vinkovic´ and Kirnan [30] in a model which can be understood as a continuous
physical analogue of Schelling’s model.
1.3 Our Contribution
We follow the model of Agarwal et al. [1], that is, we consider Swap Schelling Games and
investigate, on the one hand, the existence of equilibria and the game dynamics and, on the
other hand, the quality of the equilibria in terms of the PoA. The novel feature of our analysis
is our focus on the influence of the underlying graph and that we also investigate the impact of
restricting the agents to performing only local swaps. See Table 1 for a result overview.
While in [1] it was proven that equilibria may fail to exist for arbitrary underlying graphs
and in [15] equilibrium existence was shown for regular graphs, we extend and refine these re-
sults by investigating almost regular graphs as well as paths, 4-grids and 8-grids. We establish
equilibrium existence for all these graph classes and all our results yield polynomial time al-
gorithms for computing an equilibrium. Moreover, we study the PoA in-depth. Since it was
shown in [1] that the PoA can be unbounded for k ≥ 3, we focus on the PoA of the (local)
2-SSG. We give tight or almost tight bounds on the PoA for all mentioned graph classes which
in many cases are significant improvements on the Θ(n) bound proven in [1]. In particular, we
also improve the upper bound for balanced games on arbitrary graphs and we give PoA bounds
which depend on the minimum and maximum degree in the underlying graph.
Besides analyzing equilibria in the general model of Agarwal et al. [1], we introduce and
analyze a local variant of the model, which was already suggested by Schelling [29] but to the
best of our knowledge has not yet been explored for Schelling’s model. Our results indicate
that the local variant has favorable properties. For instance, equilibria are guaranteed to exists
on trees in the local version while in [1] it was shown that this is not the case for the general
model. Moreover, for many cases we can show that the PoA in the local version deteriorates
only slightly compared to the global version.
2 Equilibrium Existence and Dynamics
We start by providing a precise characterization which ties equilibria in 2-SSGs with the sum
of the utilities experienced by any two agents of different colors.
Lemma 2.1 A strategy profile σ for a 2-SSG is an equilibrium if and only if, for any two
agents i and j with c(i) 6= c(j) and δσ(i) ≤ δσ(j), it holds that Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1ij(σ)δσ(i) .
Proof: Fix an equilibrium σ and consider two agents i and j such that c(i) 6= c(j) and
δσ(i) ≤ δσ(j). Assume without loss of generality that i is orange and j is blue. Let oi be the
number of orange neighbors of σ(i) and bj be the number of blue neighbors of σ(j). It holds
that
Ui(σ) =
oi
δσ(i)
, Uj(σ) =
bj
δσ(j)
and
Ui(σij) =
δσ(j) − bj − 1ij(σ)
δσ(j)
, Uj(σij) =
δσ(i) − oi − 1ij(σ)
δσ(i)
.
As σ is an equilibrium, it must be either Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(σij) or Uj(σ) ≥ Uj(σij).
In the first case, we get
Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1ij(σ)
δσ(j)
,
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Equilibrium Existence Finite Improvement Property Price of Anarchy
k-SSG local k-SSG k-SSG local k-SSG 2-SSG local 2-SSG
graph classes o = 2α+ β n = 3α+ β
arbitrary × ([1]) × ([1]) ∞ ([1]) o = 1 (2n+ 8
n
− 8, 2n− 8
n
)
o = n
2
(Thm. 3.4)
≤ 3 (Thm. 3.1) o = n
2
≤ 2
(
1 + ∆−1
δ−1
)
(Thm. 3.5) δ ≥ 2
≤ no(n−o)−n
o(o−1)(n−o) (Thm. 3.1) otherwise
(
∆(∆−1)
2
− , 4(∆2 −∆ + 1)
)
∆ ≤ n− 2
(Thm. 3.6)
regular X([15]) X([15]) X([15]) X([15]) 2 + 1
α
(Thm. 3.9, 3.10) ∆ ∈ (2α, 2α+ 1) 2 + 1
α
(Cor. 3.9, Thm. 3.10) ∆ ∈ (2α, 2α+ 1)
1-regular X(Thm. 2.3) X(Thm. 2.3) X(Thm. 2.3) X(Thm. 2.3)
trees × ([1]) X(Thm. 2.6) × ([1])
(
∆(∆−1)
2
− , 4(∆2 −∆ + 1)
)
∆ ≤ n− 2
(
∆(∆−1)
2
− , 4(∆2 −∆ + 1)
)
∆ ≤ n− 2
(Cor. 3.7 + Thm. 3.6) (Cor. 3.7 + Thm. 3.6)
cycles X([15]) X([15]) X([15]) X([15]) 1 (Thm. 3.11) o = 1 1 (Thm. 3.12) o = 1
n−2
b+β
(Thm. 3.11) otherwise n−2
b−o (Thm. 3.12) o ≥ 2, b ≥ 2o
n−2
α+β
(Thm. 3.12) otherwise
paths X(Thm. 2.3) X(Thm. 2.3) X(Thm. 2.3) X(Thm. 2.3) ∞ (Thm. 3.13) n = 3 ∞ (Thm. 3.14) n = 3
2n−2
2n−5 (Thm. 3.13) n > 3, o = 1
2n−2
2n−5 (Thm. 3.14) n > 3, o = 1
n−1
b+1+β
(Thm. 3.13) n > 3, o ≥ 2, n−1
b−o−1 (Thm. 3.14) n > 3, o ≥ 2, b ≥ 2o
β ≤ 2α+ 1
n−1
b+β
(Thm. 3.13) otherwise n−1
α
(Thm. 3.14) otherwise
4-grids X(Thm. 2.4) X(Thm. 2.4) X(Thm. 2.4) X(Thm. 2.4) 25
22
(Thm. 3.15) o = 1 (3− , 3) (Thm. 3.20) 2× h grid, h ≥ 3
2 (Thm. 3.17, 3.19) otherwise
(
36
13
− , 36
13
)
(Thm. 3.21) 3× h grid, h ≥ 3(
5
2
− , 5
2
+ 
)
(Thm. 3.22) l × h grid, h, l ≥ 8 + 20

8-grids X(Thm. 2.10) X(Thm. 2.10) × (Thm. 2.9) X(Thm. 2.8) 897
704
(Thm. 3.23) o = 1 ≤ 9
4
+  (Thm. 3.26) l × h grid, h, l ≥ 8 + 18

k = 2 k = 2 ≤ 8 (Thm. 3.25) otherwise
Table 1: Result overview. The “X” symbol denotes that the respective property holds. Note that a “X” in the “k-SSG” column implies a “X”
in the local k-SSG column.The “×” symbol denotes that equilibrium existence is not guaranteed and that an IRC exists, respectively. For k = 2
we denote by b and o the number of blue and orange agents, respectively and we assume o ≤ b. If we use α or β in the respective bound, their
meaning is defined in the top of the respective column.  is a constant larger zero.
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in the second one, we get
Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1ij(σ)
δσ(i)
.
Thus, given that δσ(i) ≤ δσ(j), in any case we have that Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1ij(σ)δσ(i) .
Now fix a strategy profile σ such that, for any two agents i and j with c(i) 6= c(j) and
δσ(i) ≤ δσ(j), it holds that Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1ij(σ)δσ(i) .
Assume, by way of contradiction, that σ is not an equilibrium. Then, there exist an orange
agent i and a blue agent j such that Ui(σ) < Ui(σij) and Uj(σ) < Uj(σij). Let oi be the
number of orange neighbors of σ(i) and bj be the number of blue neighbors of σ(j). It holds
that
Ui(σ) =
oi
δσ(i)
, Uj(σ) =
bj
δσ(j)
and
Ui(σij) =
δσ(j) − bj − 1ij(σ)
δσ(j)
, Uj(σij) =
δσ(i) − oi − 1ij(σ)
δσ(i)
.
By Ui(σ) < Ui(σij), we obtain
Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1ij(σ)
δσ(j)
.
Similarly, by Uj(σ) < Uj(σij), we obtain
Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1ij(σ)
δσ(i)
.
At least one of the two derived inequalities contradicts the assumption on σ. Thus, σ is an
equilibrium.
By exploiting the potential Φ, Echzell et al. [15] show that, for any k ≥ 2, k-SSGs played on
regular graphs have the FIP and that any sequence of profitable swaps has length at most m.
This result can be extended to α-almost regular graphs for some values of α. First, we need the
following technical lemma.
Lemma 2.2 Fix a k-SSG (G, t), with k ≥ 2, a strategy profile σ and a profitable swap in σ
performed by vertices i and j such that δσ(i) ≤ δσ(j). If δσ(j) − δσ(i) ≤ 1, then the swap is
Φ-increasing. If δσ(j)− δσ(i) ≤ 2, then the swap is either Φ-increasing or Φ-preserving, with the
swap being Φ-preserving only if Uj(σ) ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
.
Proof: Assume, without loss of generality, that c(i) is orange and c(j) is blue; moreover,
define σ(i) = u and σ(j) = v. Let ou be the number of orange agents occupying vertices
adjacent to u in σ, xu be the number of neither orange not blue agents occupying vertices
adjacent to u in σ, bv be the number of blue agents occupying vertices adjacent to v in σ
and xv be the number of neither orange not blue agents occupying vertices adjacent to v in σ.
We have
Ui(σ) =
ou
δu
, Uj(σ) =
bv
δv
and
Ui(σij) =
δv − bv − xv − 1ij(σ)
δv
, Uj(σij) =
δu − ou − xu − 1ij(σ)
δu
.
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As i and j perform a profitable swap in σ, we have Ui(σ) < Ui(σij) and Uj(σ) < Uj(σij) which
imply
δubv + δvou + δuxv + δu1ij(σ) < δuδv (1)
and
δubv + δvou + δvxu + δv1ij(σ) < δuδv. (2)
Moreover, we have
Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) = δu − 1ij(σ)− ou − xu + δv − 1ij(σ)− bv − xv − ou − bv
= δu + δv − xu − xv − 2(ou + bv + 1ij(σ)).
• If δu = δv := δ′, (1) implies ou+bv+1ij(σ)+xv < δ′, while (2) implies ou+bv+1ij(σ)+xu <
δ′ which together yield
Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) = 2δ′ − xu − xv − 2(ou + bv + 1ij(σ)) > 0.
• If δu = δv − 1, (1) implies ou + bv + 1ij(σ) + xv < δv − 1 + bv+xv+1ij(σ)δv , while (2) implies
ou + bv + 1ij(σ) + xu < δv − 1 + bvδv . As bv + xv + 1ij(σ) ≤ δv by definition, we get
ou + bv + 1ij(σ) + xv ≤ δv − 1 and ou + bv + 1ij(σ) + xu ≤ δv − 1 which together yield
Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) = 2δv − 1− xu − xv − 2(ou + bv + 1ij(σ)) > 0.
• If δu = δv − 2, (1) implies ou + bv + 1ij(σ) + xv < δv − 2 + 2(bv+xv+1ij(σ))δv , while (2)
implies ou + bv + 1ij(σ) + xu < δv − 2 + 2bvδv . As bv + xv + 1ij(σ) ≤ δv by definition, we get
ou + bv + 1ij(σ) + xv ≤ δv − 1 and ou + bv + 1ij(σ) + xu ≤ δv − 1 which together yield
Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) = 2δv − 2− xu − xv − 2(ou + bv + 1ij(σ)) ≥ 0.
However, note that equality occurs only in the case in which 2bvδv > 1 which requires
bv >
δv
2 , that is, Uj(σ) >
1
2 . Clearly, as j improves after the swap, it must also be
Uj(σ) < 1.
Given the above lemma, existence and efficient computation of equilibria for k-SSGs played on
almost regular graphs can be easily obtained for any k ≥ 2.
Theorem 2.3 For any k ≥ 2, k-SSGs played on almost regular graphs has the FIP. Moreover,
at most m profitable swaps are sufficient to reach an equilibrium starting from any initial strategy
profile.
Proof: The claim comes from Lemma 2.2, as in any almost regular graph G it holds that
∆− δ = 1.
Theorem 2.3 cannot be extended beyond almost regular graphs as Agarwal et al. [1] provide
a 2-SSG played on a 2-almost regular graph (more precisely, a tree) admitting no equilibria.
However, in the next theorem, we show that positive results can be still achieved in games
played on 2-almost regular graphs obeying some additional properties.
Theorem 2.4 Let G be a 2-almost regular graph such that ∆(G) ≤ 4 and every vertex of
degree δ is adjacent to at most δ−1 vertices of degree ∆(G). Then, for any k ≥ 2, every k-SSG
played on G possesses the FIP. Moreover, at most O(nm) profitable swaps are sufficient to reach
an equilibrium starting from any initial strategy profile.
8
Proof: By Lemma 2.2, we know that any profitable swap occurring in a strategy profile σ
is Φ-increasing unless it involves an agent i occupying vertex σ(i) = u, with δu = δ, and an
agent j occupying vertex σ(j) = v, with δv = ∆, and such that Uj(σ) ∈ (12 , 1). As G is
connected, we have δ ≥ 1, which yields ∆ ∈ {3, 4}. This fact, together with Uj(σ) ∈ (12 , 1)
implies Uj(σ) ∈ {23 , 34}. As Uj(σij) > Uj(σ), we get Uj(σij) = 1 which implies that all vertices
adjacent to u are occupied by agents of the same color of agent j, which implies Ui(σ) = 0. So
we can conclude that, in order to have a Φ-preserving profitable swap, we need a profitable swap
involving a vertex u of degree δ such that Uσ−1(u)(σ) = 0 and Uσ−1ij (u)
(σ) = 1. Thus, in order
for an agent occupying u to perform once again a Φ-preserving profitable swap, all vertices in
Nu need to change their colors, i.e., all agents occupying vertices adjacent to u must perform
a profitable swap. By Lemma 2.2, any agent occupying a vertex v ∈ Nu can be involved in a
Φ-preserving swap only if δv = ∆. By assumption u has at least a neighbor of degree different
than ∆. Thus, between any two consecutive Φ-preserving profitable swaps involving an agent
residing at a fixed vertex, a Φ-increasing profitable swap has to occur. This immediately implies
that no more than n consecutive Φ-preserving profitable swaps are possible.
As 4-grids meet the conditions required by Theorem 2.4, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5 For any k ≥ 2, every k-SSG played on a 4-grid possesses the FIP. Moreover,
at most O(nm) profitable swaps are sufficient to reach an equilibrium starting from any initial
strategy profile.
As mentioned before, Agarwal et al. [1] pointed out that 2-SSGs played on trees are not guaran-
teed to admit equilibria. We show that this is no longer the case in local k-SSGs for any value
of k ≥ 2.
Theorem 2.6 For any k ≥ 2, every local k-SSG played on a tree has an equilibrium which can
be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: Root the tree T at a vertex r. We will place the agents color by color, starting with
color 1 and ending with color k. Before we place an agent at an inner vertex v all of v’s
descendants in T have to be occupied. Hence, we place the agents starting from the leaves, and
the root r′ of every subtree T ′ is the last vertex in T ′ which will be occupied. Thus, we ensure
that, if the root r′ of a subtree T ′ is occupied by an agent of color i ∈ [k], T ′ contains only
agents of color i′ ≤ i. Clearly, this construction yields a feasible strategy profile, that we denote
by σ, and can be implemented in polynomial time.
Consider two agents i and j of different colors that occupy two adjacent vertices u and v,
respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that u is the parent of v in T . Since
c(j) < c(i), the subtree of T rooted at v contains no vertex of color c(i). As a consequence
Ui(σij) = 0. Hence σ is a LSE.
Note that, as we move from 4-grids to 8-grids, Corollary 2.5 does not hold any more. In fact,
for the latter class of graphs, we show that the FIP is guaranteed to hold only for local games.
Lemma 2.7 Fix a local 2-SSG played on an 8-grid, a strategy profile σ and a profitable swap
in σ performed by agents i and j. It holds that
i) If δσ(i) = 3 and δσ(j) = 8, then the swap is Φ-decreasing by 1 if Ui(σ) = 0 and Uj(σ) =
5
8
otherwise it is a Φ-increasing swap.
ii) If δσ(i) = 5 and δσ(j) = 8, then the swap is Φ-decreasing by 1 if Ui(σ) = 0 and Uj(σ) =
6
8
otherwise it is a Φ-increasing swap.
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Proof: Assume, without loss of generality, that c(i) is orange and c(j) is blue; moreover, define
σ(i) = u and σ(j) = v. Let ou be the number of orange agents occupying vertices adjacent to u
in σ and bv be the number of blue agents occupying vertices adjacent to v in σ.
i) We have
Ui(σ) =
ou
3
, Uj(σ) =
bv
8
and
Ui(σij) =
7− bv
8
, Uj(σij) =
2− ou
3
.
As i and j perform a profitable swap in σ, we have Ui(σ) < Ui(σij) and Uj(σ) < Uj(σij)
which imply
bv <
16
3
− 8
3
ou. (3)
Moreover, we have
Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) = 3− 1− ou + 8− 1− bv − ou − bv = 9− 2ou − 2bv.
Since ou is in the set {0, 1, 2}, we have the following cases:
If ou = 0, (3) implies bv <
16
3 which yields Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) > −53 .
If ou = 1, (3) implies bv <
8
3 which yields Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) > 53 .
If ou = 2, i and j cannot perform a profitable local swap since Uj(σij) = 0.
Since Φ(σ) is integral, the statement follows.
ii) We have
Ui(σ) =
ou
5
, Uj(σ) =
bv
8
and
Ui(σij) =
7− bv
8
, Uj(σij) =
4− ou
5
.
As i and j perform a profitable swap in σ, we have Ui(σ) < Ui(σij) and Uj(σ) < Uj(σij)
which imply
bv <
32
5
− 8
5
ou. (4)
Moreover, we have
Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) = 5− 1− ou + 8− 1− bv − ou − bv = 11− 2ou − 2bv.
Since ou is in the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, we have the following cases:
If ou = 0, (4) implies bv <
32
5 which yields Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) > −95 .
If ou = 1, (4) implies bv <
24
5 which yields Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) > −35 .
If ou = 2, (4) implies bv <
16
5 which yields Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) > 35 .
If ou = 3, (4) implies bv <
8
5 which yields Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) > 95 .
If ou = 4, i and j cannot perform a profitable local swap since Uj(σij) = 0.
Since Φ(σ) is integral, we just have to show that, if ou = 1, the swap is in fact not Φ-
preserving, but Φ-increasing. Notice that bv is an integer as well. Hence, since (4) implies
bv <
24
5 , it holds that bv ≤ 4 which yields Φ(σij)− Φ(σ) ≥ 1.
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Figure 1: The coloring of G in σij after a Φ-preserving or Φ-decreasing swap of agents i and
j occupying vertices u and v. Vertices with question marks which are neither blue nor orange
can be occupied by an agent of any type. Symmetric cases are omitted.
Theorem 2.8 Any local 2-SSG played on an 8-grid possesses the FIP.
Proof: As shown in Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.7, there are only a few local swaps which can
preserve or decrease the potential Φ and all of them decrease it by at most 1. We will show that
after such a Φ-preserving or Φ-decreasing swap a number of swaps must happen before at the
same pair of vertices another Φ-preserving or Φ-decreasing swap can occur. We will show that
in total the extended potential Ψ increases which implies the FIP. Remember, that the extended
potential Ψ is simply a more fine-grained version of the potential Φ. Thus, for simplicity, for
some parts of the proof we will simply work with Φ instead of Ψ.
By Lemma 2.2, we know that any profitable swap occurring in a strategy profile σ is Φ-
increasing, unless it involves two agents i and j occupying vertices σ(i) = u and σ(j) = v with
δu 6= δv. We assume, without loss of generality, δu < δv and that c(i) is orange and c(j) is blue.
Therefore, we only have to consider the following cases:
i) δu = 3 and δv = 5.
By Lemma 2.2, we know that we have a Φ-increasing swap unless Uj(σ) ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
, in which
case we may have a Φ-preserving swap. If this happens, as δv = 5 and Uj(σij) > Uj(σ) >
1
2 , it must be that Uj(σ) =
3
5 and Uj(σij) =
2
3 which imply that, in σ, all vertices adjacent
to u are occupied by blue agents, so Ui(σ) = 0. Hence, in σij , all vertices in Nu \ {v}
are occupied by blue agents. Thus, in order for agent j (occupying vertex u in σij) to
be involved once again in a Φ-preserving profitable swap, all vertices in Nu \ {v} need to
change their colors.
Consider σij in Figure 1a. For all w ∈ Nu \{v}, we have Uσ−1ij (w)(σij) > 0. Let w1 and w2
be the unique vertices in Nu \ {v} with δw1 = 5 and δw2 = 8, respectively. For vertex w1
to change its color, the agent occupying w1 in σij can either swap with another agent
occupying a vertex z1 with δz1 = 5 which is Φ-increasing by Lemma 2.2 or with an agent
on z2 with δz2 = 8 which is Φ-increasing by Lemma 2.7. Also a swap with j is not possible,
since the agent occupying w1 has the same color as j.
If the agent on w1 performs a Φ-preserving swap with an agent on z3 with δz3 = 3 this
implies that the vertex w2 is surrounded by at least 3 orange agents which implies that
Uσ−1ij (w2)
≤ 58 . Hence, by Lemma 2.7, the agent occupying w2 can only perform a Φ-
increasing swap with an agent on a vertex with degree 5. Also, again by Lemma 2.7, any
swap with an agent on a vertex with degree 3 must be Φ-increasing, since either this swap
is with an orange agent on z4, that is a degree 3 neighbor of v, or with an orange agent
on z5, which is the remaining possible degree 3 vertex in w2’s neighborhood. A swap with
an agent on z4 must be Φ-increasing since, as v is occupied by an orange agent, the agent
on z4 has non-zero utility. If z5 is occupied with an orange agent, then the agent on w2
has a utility of at most 48 since v, z3, z4 and z5 are occupied by orange type agents.
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Figure 2: The coloring of G in σij after a Φ-decreasing swap of agents i and j occupying vertices
u and v. The question mark means that the vertex can be occupied by an agent of any type.
Symmetric cases are omitted.
Thus, in order for an agent occupying u to perform once again a profitable Φ-preserving
swap, a profitable Φ-increasing swap has to occur.
ii) δu = 5 and δv = 8.
By Lemma 2.7 we know that we have a Φ-decreasing swap by 1 if and only if Ui(σ) = 0
and Uj(σ) =
6
8 , which implies that all agents occupying vertices adjacent to u in σ are
blue. Thus, in order for agent j (occupying vertex u in σij) to be involved once again in
a Φ-decreasing profitable swap, all vertices in Nu \ {v} need to change their colors. Note
that by Lemma 2.7, a Φ-preserving swap for agent j is impossible. We distinguish several
cases: Case 1. In the first case, we assume that w1 ∈ Nu \ {v} is a corner vertex, i.e.,
δw1 = 3. Let w2 ∈ Nu \ {v} be a vertex adjacent to w1 with δw2 = 5, cf. Figure 1b and
Figure 1c. Notice, that the agents occupying w1 and w2 have utility Uσ−1ij (w1)
(σij) > 0
and Uσ−1ij (w2)
(σij) > 0, respectively, since both neighboring vertices are occupied by blue
agents. Hence, the agent occupying vertex w1 must perform at least two Φ-increasing
swaps to leave the neighborhood of u, which is necessary in order for agent j to perform
once again a profitable Φ-decreasing swap.
Case 2. In the second case, we assume that w1 ∈ Nu \ {v} is a border vertex, i.e.,
δw1 = 5. Let w2 ∈ Nu \ {v} be a vertex adjacent to w1 with δw2 = 8. Notice, that
the agents occupying w1 and w2 have utility Uσ−1ij (w1)
(σij) > 0 and Uσ−1ij (w2)
(σij) > 0,
respectively. Let w′1, w′2 and w′3 be adjacent to w1 and w2 as depicted in Figure 2a and
Figure 2b.
Case 2a. The agents occupying vertices w′1, w′2 and w′3 have utility Uσ−1ij (w′1)(σij) > 0,
Uσ−1ij (w′2)
(σij) > 0 and Uσ−1ij (w′3)
(σij) > 0. In this case, by Lemma 2.7, the agents occupying
w1 and w2 cannot leave the neighborhood of u via a Φ-preserving or Φ-decreasing swap.
Both must perform Φ-increasing swaps which increases Φ by at least 2.
Case 2b. The agent occupying w′1 has utility Uσ−1ij (w′1)(σij) = 0 and the agent residing on
w′3 has utility Uσ−1ij (w′3)(σij) > 0. From the former, it follows that the agent on w
′
1 must
be orange and the agent occupying w′2 must be blue. Moreover, the agent on w′2 must
have non-zero utility. See Figure 3a and Figure 3b.
We analyze this case by focusing on the extended potential Ψ. Remember that Ψ is
essentially Φ with the number of agents having utility 0 as a tie-breaker. Since Ψ is a
vector, we denote the change in Ψ by a profitable swap as (λ, µ) with λ, µ ∈ {+1,=,−1},
where λ denotes the change in Φ and µ denotes the change in n−z(·). Note that the swap
from σ to σij yields a change in Ψ of (−1,+1). We will now show that for vertex u to be
surrounded again by agents of the other color, Ψ will in total increase lexicographically.
In particular, it suffices to focus on the change in Ψ induced by vertices w1 and w2
becoming occupied by an orange agent. Clearly, if both swaps are Φ-increasing, then also
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Figure 3: (a) and (b): the coloring of G in σij after a Ψ-decreasing swap by (−1,+1) of agents i
and j occupying vertices u and v in case 2b. Symmetric cases are omitted. (c) and (d) show σ1
and σ2, respectively, after a swap starting with the situation in (b).
Ψ increases lexicographically. Hence, we focus on the cases where one of these swaps is
not Φ-increasing.
If δw′1 = 3 then the agent occupying w1 can be involved in a Φ-preserving swap with the
agent on w′1. This swap yields a change in Ψ of (=,+1) since both agents have non-zero
utility after the swap. This results in σ1, see Figure 3c. However, the agent on w2 has non-
zero utility since u is in its neighborhood and all agents in her neighborhood on vertices
with degree 3 or 5 have non-zero utility. Thus, by Lemma 2.7, the agent on w2 can only
perform a profitable swap which changes Ψ by (+1,=). In total, Ψ must change by at
least (=,+1) which implies a lexicographic increase.
The only other case is that the agent occupying w2 can be involved in a Φ-decreasing
swap with the agent residing on w′1 in both cases δw′1 = 3 or δw′1 = 5. Let σ2 denote the
corresponding strategy profile, see Figure 3d. Note that this swap changes Ψ by (−1,+1).
Now there are two ways of how w1 can become occupied by an orange agent. First, if the
agents on w1 and w2 or v swap, then, by Lemma 2.7, Ψ changes by (+1,=). After this
swap, the blue agent on w2 or v with non-zero utility has to perform another swap with
an orange agent, which changes Ψ again by (+1,=). The second way of w1 becoming
occupied by an orange agent is that first vertex w′1 or w′2 becomes occupied by an orange
agent and then this agent swaps with the agent on w1. However, both these swaps each
change Ψ by (+1,=). In total, Ψ lexicographically changes by at least (−1,+1), (−1,+1),
(+1,=) and (+1,=) which in total yields a lexicographic increase.
Case 2c. The agent residing w′2 has utility Uσ−1ij (w′2)(σij) = 0. It follows that the agent
on w′2 is orange and all neighboring agents must be blue. Moreover, the agents on w′1 and
w′3 must have non-zero utility. See Figure 4a and Figure 4b.
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Figure 4: (a) and (b): the coloring of G in σij after a Ψ-decreasing swap by (−1,+1) of agents
i and j occupying vertices u and v in case 2c. Symmetric cases are omitted. (c) shows σ3 after
a swap starting with the situation in (a) or (b).
If δw′2 = 8, the agents occupying w1 and w2 cannot be involved in a Φ-preserving or Φ-
decreasing swap and therefore both must perform Φ-increasing swaps to leave the neigh-
borhood of u. In total this yields an increase in Φ and thus also in Ψ.
If δw′2 = 5 then the agent occupying w2 can be involved in a Φ-decreasing swap with the
agent on w′2. Note that this swap changes Ψ by (−1,+1) and let σ3 denote the resulting
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Figure 5: (a) the coloring of G in σij after a Ψ-decreasing swap by (−1,+1) of agents i and j
occupying vertices u and v in case 2d. (b) the strategy profile σ4. (c) the strategy profile σ5.
(d) the strategy profile σ6. Symmetric cases are omitted.
strategy profile, see Figure 4c. This yields a similar situation as in σ2 in Figure 3d and
we can argue analogously that at least two swaps which each change Ψ by (+1,=) must
happen. In total, Ψ increases lexicographically.
Case 2d. The agents occupying w′1 and w′3 have utility Uσ−1ij (w′1)(σij) = 0 and Uσ−1ij (w′3)(σij) =
0. This implies that the agents on w′1 and w′3 must be orange, the agent on w′2 must be
blue and that the latter has non-zero utility. See Figure 5a and Figure 6a
We consider the settings in Figure 5a and Figure 6a separately.
We start with the setting in Figure 5a.
Let δw′1 = 3. In this case a swap of the agents on w
′
1 and w1 is not profitable. However, by
Lemma 2.7, the agent on w′1 could perform a Φ-decreasing swap with the agent on w2 if
and only if the agent on w′4 is orange. This swap would change Ψ by (−1,+1) and yields
strategy profile σ4 depicted in Figure 5b. Now for the agent on w1 to become orange, at
least two Φ-increasing swaps are necessary: a swap with the agent on w2 is not profitable,
so at least one of the vertices w′1, w′2, w3 must become occupied by an orange agent before
a swap with the agent on w1 is possible. Thus, in total Ψ increases, since there are at
least two Φ-increasing swaps necessary. In the setting in Figure 5a, a swap between the
agents on w′1 and w1 can only be Φ-neutral, if vertex w3 becomes occupied by an orange
agent and vertices w′2 and w2 remain occupied by blue agents. In this case, the swap of
the blue agent on w3 must be Φ-increasing. However, this is not a profitable swap for an
orange agent, since an agent occupying vertex w′4 or w′5 will not gain additional orange
neighbors by swapping to w3. Hence, the strategy profile σ5 depicted in Figure 5c is not
possible.
If δw′1 = 5, then the agent occupying w2 can be involved in a profitable swap with the
agent on w′1 which decreases Ψ by (−1,+1), but, by Lemma 2.7, only if w′4 is occupied by
a blue agent. After the swap we get the strategy profile σ6 depicted in Figure 5d. Now,
the agent on w1 is in an analogous situtation as in σ4 depicted in Figure 5b. By analogous
reasoning, at least two Φ-increasing swaps must happen so that vertex w1 can become
occupied by an orange agent. This implies that in total Ψ increases.
Next, we consider the setting depicted in Figure 6a.
Let δw′1 = 3 and δw′3 = 5. By Lemma 2.2, a swap by the agents on vertices w
′
1 and w1
changes Ψ by (=,+1) and leads to the strategy profile σ7 depicted in Figure 6b. Now,
note that since the agent on w2 has a utility of at most
5
8 , a swap with the agent on
w′3 must be Φ-increasing, which in total yields an increase in Ψ. Another possibility is
that in σij depicted in Figure 6a the agents on w
′
1 and w2 swap. By Lemma 2.7, this
swap changes Ψ by (−1,+1) if and only if w′4 is occupied by a blue agent. Let σ8 be the
resulting strategy profile which is depicted in Figure 6c. Now, note that the agent on w1 is
in a similar situation as the agent on w1 in σ2 in Figure 3d. With an analogous reasoning
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Figure 6: (a) the other option for the coloring of G in σij after a Ψ-decreasing swap by (−1,+1)
of agents i and j occupying vertices u and v in case 2d. (b) the strategy profile σ7. (c) the
strategy profile σ8. (d) the strategy profile σ9. Symmetric cases are omitted.
we get that at least two Φ-increasing swaps must happen so that w1 becomes occupied by
an orange agent. In total we get an increase in Ψ.
Let δw′1 = 5 and thus δw′3 = 5 or δw′3 = 8. In this case, since the agent on w2 has utility of
at most 58 and by Lemma 2.7 no Φ-decreasing swaps involving the agents on w1 and w2
are possible. Thus, in total at least two Φ-increasing swaps must occur so that w1 and w2
become occupied by orange agents which implies a total increase in Φ and thus also in Ψ.
The last remaining situation in the setting depicted in Figure 6a is that both w′1 and w′3
are corner vertices, hence, δw′1 = 3 and δw′3 = 3. By Lemma 2.2, a swap by the agents on
vertices w′1 and w1 changes Ψ by (=,+1) and leads to the strategy profile similar to σ7
depicted in Figure 6b. If the agent on w2 has a utility of
5
8 a swap with the agent on w
′
3
changes Ψ by (−1,+1) and leads to the strategy profile σ9 depicted in Figure 6d. To be
situated in the same situation, that the agents occupying u, w′1 and w′3 are involved in
Φ-decreasing or Φ-preserving swaps, the agent w′2 has to perform two Φ-decreasing swaps
to leave the neighborhood of w′1 and w′3. In total Ψ must change by at least (=,+3) which
implies a lexicographic increase.
Case 2e. The agent occupying w′3 has utility Uσ−1ij (w′3)(σij) = 0 and the agents on w
′
1 and
w′2 have non-zero utility. It follows that w′3 and w′2 must be occupied by an orange and
a blue agent, respectively. If δw′1 = 3, then also w
′
1 must have a blue agent. Otherwise,
the agent on w′1 can also be orange but then it must have another neighboring orange
neighbor. See Figure 7 for all possible settings.
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Figure 7: Possible strategy profiles σij in case 2e. Symmetric cases are omitted.
Let δw′3 = 3. Then, by Lemma 2.7, a profitable swap of the agents w
′
3 and w2 which
decreases Ψ by (−1,+1) is possible, if the agent on w′4 is orange so that the agent on w2
has utility 58 , cf. Figure 7c. After this swap we get a strategy profile which, from the
point of view of the agent on w1, is analogous to σ2 in Figure 3d. Hence, at least two
Φ-increaing swaps are necessary so that vertices v, w1 and w2 become occupied by orange
agents. Thus, in total Ψ increases.
Let δw′3 = 5 (cf. Figure 7a and Figure 7c). Then, by Lemma 2.7, a profitable swap of the
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Figure 8: We focus on the change in Φ induced by vertices w1 and w2 where the swaps are not
Φ-increasing. (a) strategy profile σij after a Φ-preserving or Φ-decreasing swap of agents i and
j occupying vertices u and v. (b) shows the strategy profile before the agent occupying v can
perform another Φ-decreasing swap.
agents on w′3 and w2 which decreases Ψ by (−1,+1) is possible, if the agent on w′4 has
a suitable type so that the agent on w2 has utility
6
8 . After this swap we get a strategy
profile which, from the point of view of the agent on w1, is analogous to σ2 in Figure 3d
or σ4 in Figure 5b. In both cases at least two Φ-increaing swaps are necessary so that
vertices v, w1 and w2 become occupied by orange agents. Thus, in total Ψ increases.
Let δw′3 = 8 (cf. Figure 7b and Figure 7d). In this case no Φ-decreasing or Φ-preserving
swaps which involve the agents on w1 or w2 are possible. Thus, at least two Φ-increasing
swaps must happen so that w1 and w2 become occupied by orange agents. Hence, in total
Φ and thus also Ψ increases.
Since we have completed all possible combinations for agents with zero utility on the
vertices w′1, w′2, w′3 this finishes case (ii).
iii) δu(G) = 3 and δv(G) = 8
By Lemma 2.7 we know that we have a Φ-decreasing swap by 1 if and only if Ui(σ) = 0
and Uj(σ) =
5
8 . This implies that all vertices adjacent to u are occupied by blue agents.
Thus, in order for agent j (occupying vertex u in σij) to be involved once again in a
Φ-decreasing profitable swap, all vertices in Nu \ {v} must become occupied by orange
agents.
Consider σij in Figure 8a. Notice, that all neighboring vertices of w1 and w2 must be
occupied by agents with non-zero utility, since v is occupied by the orange agent i in
σij . Hence, no neighboring agent of w1 and w2 can be included in a Φ-decreasing swap
before agent i on vertex v performs another profitable swap. Hence, we have to distinguish
between two cases.
Case 1. We assume that agent i does not perform another profitable swap, before the
agents placed on w1 and w2 swap. As already mentioned, no neighboring agent of w1
and w2 has utility zero and since the agents on w1 and w2 have positive utility as well,
two Φ-increasing swaps will occur before the agent occupying u can perform once again a
Φ-decreasing swap. Thus, in total Φ increases.
Case 2. We assume that agent i will perform another profitable swap before the agents
placed on w1 and w2 swap. Hence, it is possible that an agent in the neighborhood of w1
or w2 has utility zero and is involved in a Φ-preserving or Φ-decreasing swap. However,
the swap of agent i is Φ-increasing and will be performed with a blue agent. Hence, since j
residing on u is also blue, the color of the agent on v has to change to orange before the
agent on u can perform another Φ-decreasing swap. Consider Figure 8b. If the agent
on w′1 or w′2 can perform another Φ-decreasing swap, this is only possible with the agent
occupying v. Assume, without loss of generality, there is a profitable Φ-decreasing swap
between the agents residing on w′1 and v. Then, afterwards, for the agent residing on w1
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to leave the neighborhood of u, there will be at least two Φ-increasing swaps since the
agent occupying w′1 is blue and has positive utility. However, this is necessary in order
for an agent occupying vertex u, to perform once again a profitable Φ-decreasing swap.
Thus, in total Φ increases.
We have shown that after a Ψ-decreasing profitable local swap involving agents on two vertices u
and v some additional swaps are necessary before another Ψ-decreasing swap can happen again
involving the same vertices. Moreover, we have shown that in total these additional swaps
increase Ψ more than it was decreased by the initial swap. Thus, in total Ψ increases.
Now we will see that compared to the local k-SSG, the k-SSG on 8-grids behaves differently.
There the FIP does not hold.
Theorem 2.9 There cannot exist a potential function for the k-SSG played on an 8-grid, for
any k ≥ 2.
a b
c
d
(1)
(a) Initial strategy
profile
a c
b
d
(2)
(b) Strategy profile
after the first swap
d c
b
a
(3)
(c) Strategy profile
after the second swap
d a
b
c
(4)
(d) Strategy profile
after the third swap
Figure 9: An improving response cycle for the k-SSG played on a 8-grid. The agent types are
marked orange and blue.
Proof: We prove the statement by providing an improving response cycle σ0, . . . ,σ4. The
construction is shown in Figure 9, where vertices are labeled with the agent occupying them.
We have orange and blue agents. Agents with other types can be placed in a grid outside of the
depicted cutout.
In the initial strategy profile σ0 (Figure 9a), Ub(σ
0) = 35 and Uc(σ
0) = 38 . Both agents b
and c improve by swapping, since in σ1 := σ0bc we have Ub(σ
1) = 58 and Uc(σ
1) = 25 . After
the first swap (Figure 9b), agents a and d can perform a profitable swap, since Ua(σ
1) = 13 ,
Ud(σ
1) = 58 and in σ
2 := σ1ad we have Ua(σ
2) = 38 and Ud(σ
2) = 23 . Then (Figure 9c), agents a
and c can swap and improve from Ua(σ
2) = 38 and Uc(σ
2) = 35 to Ua(σ
3) = 25 and Uc(σ
3) = 58 ,
respectively, with σ3 := σ2ac. Finally (Figure 9d), agents b and d can improve by swapping, since
Ub(σ
3) = 58 , Ud(σ
3) = 13 and in σ
4 := σ3bd we have Ub(σ
4) = 23 and Ud(σ
4) = 38 . Now observe
that the coloring induced by σ4 is the same as the one induced by σ0 (see Figure 9a, where
a exchanges position with b and c exchanges position with d). So, the sequence of profitable
swaps defined above can be repeated over and over mutatis mutandis.
However, even if convergence to an equilibrium is not guaranteed for k ≥ 2, they are guaranteed
to exist for k = 2.
Theorem 2.10 Every 2-SSG played on an 8-grid has an equilibrium which can be computed in
polynomial time.
Proof: Assume without loss of generality that the grid is such that ` ≤ h. If this is not the
case, simply rotate the grid by ninety degrees. We give two different constructions depending
on how the number of orange agents compares with the threshold 2`− 1.
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If o ≥ 2` − 1, let σ be the strategy profile in which orange agents occupy the grid starting
from the upper-left corner and proceedings towards the right filling the grid in increasing order
of rows, see Figure 10 for a pictorial example. Denote by x the number of entirely orange rows
and by y the number of orange vertices in the unique row containing both orange and blue
vertices (if this row exists, otherwise set y = 0). Moreover, whenever y 6= 0, let u be the last
orange vertex (i.e., the y-th vertex along the (x+1)-th row) and v be the first blue one (i.e., the
vertex at the right of u); again, see Figure 10 for an example. Observe that, by the assumption
o ≥ 2`− 1 and the fact that o ≤ b, the following two properties hold:
(P.1) x ≥ 1 and x = 1 if and only if y = `− 1;
(P.2) x ≤ h2 and x = h2 if and only if y ≤ `2 .
u v
x
h− xy
Figure 10: The structure of an equilibrium when o ≥ 2`− 1.
Fix an orange agent i. It is easy to see that, by property (P.1), it holds that
Ui(σ) ≥

2
3 if σ(i) is a corner vertex,
3
5 if σ(i) is a border vertex unless y = 1 which gives Ui(σ) =
2
5 ,
5
8 if σ(i) is an inner vertex unless σ(i) = u which gives Ui(σ) =
1
2 .
Fix a blue agent j. It is easy to see that, by property (P.2), it holds that
Uj(σ) ≥

2
3 if σ(j) is a corner vertex,
3
5 if σ(j) is a border vertex unless y = `− 1 which gives Uj(σ) = 25 ,
5
8 if σ(j) is an inner vertex unless σ(j) = v which gives Uj(σ) =
1
2 .
As 25 + min{23 , 35 , 58} ≥ 1, it follows by Lemma 2.1 that profitable swaps are possible in σ only
between an orange agent i and a blue agent j satisfying one of the following three conditions:
(i) Ui(σ) =
2
5 and Uj(σ) =
2
5 ,
(ii) Ui(σ) =
2
5 and Uj(σ) =
1
2 ,
(iii) Ui(σ) =
1
2 and Uj(σ) =
2
5 .
Case (i) requires 1 = y = `− 1 which implies ` = 2 so that 1ij(σ) = 1. By δσ(i) = δσ(j) = 5,
we get Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1ij(σ)5 satisfying the condition of Lemma 2.1.
Case (ii) requires y = 1 (which yields σ(i) = u) and σ(j) = v so that 1ij(σ) = 1. By
δσ(i) = 5 and δσ(j) = 8, we get Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) ≥ 1 − 1ij(σ)5 again satisfying the condition of
Lemma 2.1.
Case (iii) requires y = ` − 1 (which yields σ(j) = v) and σ(i) = u so that 1ij(σ) = 1. By
δσ(j) = 5 and δσ(i) = 8, we get Ui(σ)+Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1ij(σ)5 satisfying the condition of Lemma 2.1.
Thus, σ is an equilibrium and can be constructed in polynomial time.
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If o < 2`−1, a more involved construction is needed. For any o ∈ [14], the proposed strategy
profile σ is depicted in Figure 11. We stress that the two assumptions ` ≤ h and o < 2`−1 imply
that the grid is large enough to accommodate a coloring implementing σ. It is not difficult to
check by direct inspection that σ is an equilibrium. To this aim, it is important to observe that,
when o ≥ 7, there must be at least two blue agents occupying vertices on the first row, otherwise
the assumption o < 2` − 1 would be contradicted. Now, for any 15 ≤ o < 2` − 1, we propose
a general rule, which can be implemented in polynomial time, to construct an equilibrium
profile σ. First, we define some suitable structures. For an integer x ≥ 5, an x-triangle is a
strategy profile obtained as follows: for each y = x down to 1, y orange agents are assigned
to the first y vertices of the (x + 1 − y)-th row, see Figure 12. Thus, a total of x(x+1)2 orange
agents are assigned. For an integer x ≥ 5, an (x, 1)-almost triangle is a strategy profile obtained
by assigning x orange agents to the first x vertices of the first two rows, x − 1 orange agents
to the first x − 1 vertices of the third row, and then, for each y = x − 3 down to 2, y orange
agents are assigned to the first y vertices of the (x + 1 − y)-th row, see the top-left picture in
Figure 13. Thus, a total of
∑x−3
i=2 i + 3x − 1 = x(x+1)2 + 1 orange agents are assigned. For a
pair of integers (x, y), with x ≥ 5 and 2 ≤ y ≤ x, we define an (x, y)-almost triangle as follows:
for 2 ≤ y ≤ x − 2, the (x, y)-almost triangle is obtained from the (x, y − 1)-one by locating an
orange agent to the first non-orange vertex of the (y + 2)-th row; the (x, x− 1)-almost triangle
is obtained by locating an orange agent to the first non-orange vertex (i.e., the second) of the
x-th row of the (x, x−2)-one; the (x, x)-almost triangle is obtained by locating an orange agent
to the first non-orange vertex (i.e., the (x + 1)-th) of the first row of the (x, x − 1)-one (see
Figure 13 for a pictorial example).
Now observe that any number o ≥ 15 can be decomposed as o = x(x+1)2 +y for some integers x
and y such that x ≥ 5 and 0 ≤ y ≤ x. The strategy profile σ is the x-triangle if y = 0 and the
(x, y)-almost triangle, otherwise. Clearly, σ can be constructed in polynomial time. We are left
to prove that σ is an equilibrium. We shall use Lemma 2.1 in conjunction with the following
claims which can be easily verified with the help of Figures 12 and 13. In any x-triangle σ with
x ≥ 5, Ui(σ) ≥ 25 for any orange agent i and Uj(σ) ≥ 58 for any blue agent j. Thus, σ is an
equilibrium. Now, let us consider (x, y)-almost triangles. If y ∈ [x− 3], we have Ui(σ) ≥ 12 for
any orange agent i and Uj(σ) ≥ 12 for any blue agent j. So, σ is an equilibrium. If y = x− 2,
Ui(σ) ≥ 12 for each orange agent i, except for the one occupying the unique orange vertex at the
x-th row who gets utility equal to 25 ; moreover, Uj(σ) ≥ 58 for each blue agent j, except for the
one occupying the first blue vertex of the x-th row (see the bottom-left picture in Figure 13).
Thus, we get Ui(σ) +Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1ij(σ)min{δσ(i),δσ(j)} for each orange agent i and blue agent j. So, σ
is an equilibrium. If y = x− 1, Ui(σ) ≥ 12 for each orange agent i and Uj(σ) ≥ 58 for each blue
agent j, thus implying that σ is an equilibrium (see the bottom-middle picture in Figure 13).
o = 1 o = 2 o = 3 o = 4 o = 5 o = 6 o = 7 o = 8 o = 9
o = 10 o = 11 o = 12 o = 13 o = 14
Figure 11: The structure of an equilibrium when o < 2` − 1 and o ∈ [14]. Only the orange
vertices are depicted.
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Figure 12: The structure of an x-triangle, with x = 6. The grid needs to have additional blue
rows and columns which are not depicted.
Figure 13: The structure of (x, y)-triangles, with x = 6 and y ∈ [6]. The grid needs to have
additional blue rows and columns which are not depicted.
Finally, if y = x, Ui(σ) ≥ 25 for each orange agent i and Uj(σ) ≥ 58 for each blue agent j (see
the bottom-right picture in Figure 13), and so also in this case σ is an equilibrium.
3 Price of Anarchy
In the following section, we consider the efficiency of equilibrium assignments and bound the PoA
for different classes of underlying graphs. In particular, besides investigating general graphs,
we analyze regular graphs, cycles, paths, 4-grids and 8-grids. Agarwal et al. [1] already proved
that the PoA for the 2-SSG is in Θ(n) on underlying star graphs if there are at least two agents
of each type and between 921448 and 4 for the balanced version, i.e., o =
n
2 . We improve this result
by providing an upper bound of 3 which tends to 2 for n going to infinity. Furthermore, the
authors of [1] showed that the PoA can be unbounded for k ≥ 3. Therefore, we concentrate on
the (local) 2-SSG for several graph classes.
3.1 General Graphs
Remember that for a 2-SSG game, we assume that o is the less frequent color.
We significantly improve and generalize the results of [1] by providing a general upper bound
of no(n−o)−no(o−1)(n−o) for the case of o > 1. For balanced games, it yields an upper bound of
2(n+2)
n
which shows that the PoA tends to 2 as the number of vertices increases. Moreover, if bo ∈ O(1),
the PoA is constant.
With the help of Lemma 2.1, we can now prove our general upper bound for the 2-SSG.
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Theorem 3.1 The PoA of 2-SSGs with o > 1 is at most no(n−o)−no(o−1)(n−o) . Hence, the PoA ∈ O
(
b
o
)
.
Proof: Fix a 2-SSG with o > 1 orange agents played on a graph G with n vertices. First, we
observe that the social welfare of a social optimum is at most n − 2 + o−1o + b−1b = n − 1o − 1b ,
as there must be at least one orange vertex that is adjacent to at least one blue vertex, thus
getting utility at most o−1o , and at least one blue vertex that is adjacent to at least one orange
vertex, thus getting utility at most b−1b .
Given a strategy profile σ′, a feasible pair is a pair of vertices (u, v) such that u and v are
occupied by agents of different colors in σ′ and {u, v} /∈ E(G), i.e., u and v are not adjacent.
Now fix a swap equilibrium σ and consider a maximum cardinality matching M of feasible
pairs. Clearly 0 ≤ |M | ≤ o. Hence, |M | = o − x for some 0 ≤ x ≤ o. If x > 0, then, there are
exactly x orange and at least x blue leftover vertices of V that do not belong to any feasible
pair in M . As M has maximum cardinality, each orange leftover vertex has to be adjacent to all
leftover blue ones and vice-versa. That is, for each leftover vertex u, we have δu(G) ≥ x. Let T
be a set of pairs of vertices obtained by matching each leftover orange vertex with a leftover
blue one. By Lemma 2.1, it holds for each (u, v) ∈ M , Uσ−1(u)(σ) + Uσ−1(v)(σ) ≥ 1 and for
each (u, v) ∈ T , Uσ−1(u)(σ) + Uσ−1(v)(σ) ≥ 1 − 1x . Thus, the social welfare of σ is at least
o− x+ x(1− 1x) = o− 1.
Corollary 3.2 The PoA of 2-SSGs is constant if bo is constant.
We want to emphasize that for the case where both colors are perfectly balanced, the PoA is
constant. As for n = 2 the 2-SSG is trivial and has a PoA = 1, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3 The PoA of balanced 2-SSGs is at most min
{
3, 2(n+2)n
}
.
We will now show that in contrast to the balanced 2-SSG, the balanced local k-SSG has a much
higher LPoA.
Theorem 3.4 The LPoA of local balanced 2-SSGs with o > 1 is between 2n+ 8n−8 and 2n− 8n .
Proof: Fix a 2-SSG with o > 1 orange agents played on a graph G with n vertices. First, we
observe that the social welfare of a social optimum is at most n− 2+o−1o + n−o−1n−o = n− no(n−o) ,
as there must be at least one orange vertex that is adjacent to at least one blue vertex.
Now fix a local swap equilibrium σ. We will show that the social welfare of σ is at least 12 .
First, assume that there is exactly one vertex v with δv(G) > 1. Then, G has to be a star and
since o > 1 there has to be at least one leaf vertex with an agent i with Ui(σ) = 1. Therefor,
there has to be at least two adjacent vertices v1 and v2 with δi > 1 for i ∈ {1, 2}. By Lemma 2.1
we know that if v1 and v2 are occupied by agents of different types then Uσ−1(v1) +Uσ−1(v2) ≥ 12 .
Hence, assume that there is no such pair v1 and v2 and assume, without loss of generality, that
all adjacent vertex pairs v1 and v2, with δi > 1 for i ∈ {1, 2}, are occupied by orange agents. It
follows, since G is connected, that all blue agents only occupy leaf vertices. If the social welfare
of σ is less than 12 , all orange agents have to be surrounded by more blue than orange agents.
Since one blue agent is only adjacent to one orange agent this contradicts our requirement of a
balanced game. Hence, the PoA is upper bounded by 2
(
n− no(n−o)
)
. With o = n2 this is equal
to 2n− 8n .
For the lower bound consider the graph G in Figure 14. G consists of two stars which are
connected by a common leaf vertex. Let v1 be the center of the first star, v3 be the center of
the second star and v2 be the common vertex. We first prove that the configuration shown
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...
...
v1
v2
v3
(a) Worst equilibrium
...
...
v1
v2
v3
(b) Social optimum
Figure 14: A lower bound for the local balanced 2-SSG. The agent types are marked orange
and blue.
in Figure 14a is an equilibrium. Note, that none of the leaf vertices can perform a profitable
swap since the agents on v1 and v3, respectively, would receive Uσ−1(v1) = 0 and Uσ−1(v2) = 0,
respectively. So the only possible swap is between the agents placed on v1 and v2. However
the orange agent currently located on v1 would not increase her utility by swapping since she
would be surround only by two blue agents placed on v1 and v2 and therefor would receive a
utility equals 0. Hence, no local swap is possible and only the agents placed on v2 and v3 receive
positive utility. The social welfare is equal to 12 +
1
o−1 which is for o =
n
2 equal to
1
2 +
2
n−2 .
The social optimum is shown in Figure 14b. This is easy to see, since we meet the trivial upper
bound n− 2+o−1o + n−o−1n−o = n− no(n−o) which is for o = n2 equal to n− 4n . Hence, the PoA is
lower bounded by 2(n−2)
2
n = 2n+
8
n − 8.
If the underlying graph G does not contain leaf vertices, i.e., all vertices have at least degree 2,
we can prove a smaller LPoA. In particular, if the ratio between the maximum and minimum
degree of vertices in G is constant, we achieve a constant LPoA.
Theorem 3.5 The LPoA of local 2-SSGs on a graph G with minimum degree δ ≥ 2 and max-
imum degree ∆ is at most 2
(
1 + ∆+1δ−1
)
.
Proof: Fix a local swap equilibrium σ on G with δ(G) ≥ 2. Let ρ := δ−12δ and let o′ and b′
be the numbers of orange and blue agents that have a utility strictly less than ρ, respectively.
Clearly, o − o′ and b − b′ are the numbers of orange and blue agents that have a utility of at
least ρ, respectively. We first prove that b− b′ ≥ δo′∆ as well as that o− o′ ≥ δb
′
∆ and show then
how these two inequalities imply the theorem statement.
We only prove the first inequality, i.e., b − b′ ≥ δo′∆ as the proof of the other inequality is
similar. Let i and j, respectively, be a blue agent and an orange agent that occupy two adjacent
vertices in G, say σ(i) = u and σ(j) = v, and such that Uj(σ) < ρ. By Lemma 2.1, we have
that Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) ≥ 1− 1δ , from which we derive Ui(σ) > 1− 1δ − δ−12δ = δ−12δ = ρ.
Let G′ be the subgraph of G containing all the non-monochromatic edges, i.e., each edge
of G′ connects a vertex occupied by an orange agent with a vertex occupied by a blue agent.
Clearly, G′ is bipartite. Consider the vertex-induced subgraph H of G′ in which we have all
the o′ orange agents having a utility strictly less than ρ on one side and all the b− b′ blue agents
having a utility of at least ρ on the other side. Since for each vertex v of H occupied by an
orange agent, there are at least (1−ρ)δv ≥ δ+12 vertices adjacent to u that are occupied by blue
agents and each such blue agent have a utility of at least ρ, the degree of v in H is at least δ+12 .
Therefore,
|E(H)| ≥ δ + 1
2
o′. (5)
22
Furthermore, since each edge of H is incident to a blue agent that has a utility of at least ρ,
the degree in H of every vertex u that is occupied by a blue agent is at most (1− ρ)δu ≤ δ+12δ ∆.
Therefore,
|E(H)| ≤ ∆(δ + 1)
2δ
(b− b′). (6)
Plugging (5) into (6) and simplifying gives b− b′ ≥ δ∆o′.
Finally, we show how b − b′ ≥ δo′∆ and o − o′ ≥ δb
′
∆ imply the theorem statement. The
average utility of all the agents in H is at least ρ(b−b
′)
o′+(b−b′) ≥
ρ δ
∆
1+ δ
∆
= δ−12(δ+∆) . Similarly, the
average utility of the b′ blue agents whose utilities are strictly less than ρ and the o− o′ orange
agents whose utilities are of at least ρ is also at least δ−12(δ+∆) . Therefore, the LPoA is at most
2(δ+∆)
δ−1 = 2
(
1 + ∆+1δ−1
)
.
We observe that the LPoA on a graph with minimum degree δ(G) = 1 can be unbounded.
Consider the star graph with ∆ leaves and let σ be a strategy profile where the unique orange
agent occupies the star center, while all the blue agents occupy the leaves. This is clearly a
swap equilibrium of 0 social welfare. Any configuration in which a blue agent occupies the star
center has strictly positive social welfare.
However, as the following theorem shows, the LPoA can be upper bounded by a function
of ∆ if we force n ≥ ∆ + 2, i.e., we avoid the pathological star graph of ∆ + 1 vertices.
Theorem 3.6 For every  > 0, the LPoA of local 2-SSGs on a graph G with maximum degree
∆ ≤ n− 2 is between ∆(∆−1)2 −  and 4(∆2 −∆ + 1).
Proof: We prove the upper bound first. Let σ be a local swap equilibrium onG with ∆ ≤ n−2.
We claim that, for every agent i, with δσi ≥ 2, there is an agent j, with σj ∈ Nσi and δσj ≥ 2,
such that Ui(σ) ≥ 1∆ or Uj(σ) ≥ 12 . Indeed, assume that Ui(σ) < 1∆ . This implies that
Ui(σ) = 0 and, therefore, that every agent occupying a vertex in Nσi is of type different from
that of i. Therefore, if for the sake of contradiction we assume that Uj(σ) <
1
2 , then Ui(σij) > 0
and Uj(σij ≥ δσi−1σ ≥ 12 , thus contradicting that σ is a local swap equilibrium.
This implies that all the vertices of the graph can be partitioned into two types of sets:
type-1 set: It has a size smaller than or equal to ∆ + 1 and contains a vertex u occupied by
an agent that has a utility of at least 1∆ together with a subset of Nu;
type-2 set: It has a size smaller than or equal to 1 + ∆(∆ − 1) = ∆2 − ∆ + 1 and contains
a vertex u occupied by an agent that has a utility of at least 12 together with a subset of
Nu ∪
⋃
v∈Nu Nv.
The average utility of all the agents contained in type-1 sets is at least 1
∆2+∆
, while the average
utility of all the agents contained in type-2 sets is at least 1
2(∆2−∆+1) . Therefore, as ∆ ≥ 2, the
average utility of an agent is at least
min
{
1
∆2 + ∆
,
1
2(∆2 −∆ + 1)
}
=
1
2(∆2 −∆ + 1) .
The upper bound of the LPoA follows.
For the lower bound of the LPoA, it is enough to consider the instance with o orange agents
and b = (∆−2)o blue agents, thus, n = (∆−1)o, consisting of a cycle of length o, whose vertices
are all occupied by the orange agents, to which we add ∆ − 2 degree-1 vertices appended to
each vertex. Clearly, all the degree-1 vertices are occupied by the blue agents. It is easy to
check that the given strategy profile is a local swap equilibrium. Now, observe that each blue
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agent has a utility of 0, while each orange agent has a utility of 2∆ . The social welfare of this
local swap equilibrium is equal to 2o∆ =
2n
∆(∆−1) . If we assume that o is a multiple of ∆ − 1,
then the social optimum shown in the picture has a social welfare equal to n− 4 + 4∆−1∆ = n−4∆ .
Therefore, if we choose n ≥ 2(∆−1) , we have that the LPoA is lower bounded by(
n− 4
∆
)
∆(∆− 1)
2n
=
∆(∆− 1)
2
− 2(∆− 1)
n
≥ ∆(∆− 1)
2
− .
If we desist from star graphs, the class of trees meet the conditions required by Theorem 3.6
and we get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.7 For every  > 0, the LPoA of local 2-SSGs on a tree graph G with maximum
degree ∆ ≤ n− 2 is at least ∆(∆−1)2 − .
Proof: Consider the lower bound construction given in Theorem 3.6 in which we remove one
edge from the cycle. There is a threshold value f(∆, ) such that for every n ≥ f(∆, ), the
LPoA is at least ∆(∆−1)2 − .
3.2 Regular Graphs
In this section we provide upper and lower bounds to the LPoA for regular graphs, i.e., for
graphs where all vertices have the same degree. The key is the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3.8 Let σ be a local swap equilibrium, and let ∆ = 2α+β, with α ∈ N and β ∈ {0, 1}.
Let X ⊆ V be a subset of vertices such that δv = ∆ for every v ∈ NX :=
⋃
x∈X Nx. Finally,
let Z ⊆ NX be the set of vertices occupied by the agents that have a utility strictly larger than
ρ := α2α+1 . Then, the average utility of the agents that occupy the vertices in X ∪Z is at least ρ.
Proof: Let Xo ⊆ X (respectively, Xb ⊆ X) be the set of vertices occupied by the orange
(respectively, blue) agents that have a utility strictly less than ρ. Similarly, let Zo ⊆ NX
(respectively, Zb ⊆ NX) be the set of vertices occupied by the orange (respectively, blue) agents
that have a utility strictly larger than ρ. We show that the average utility of the agents that
occupy the vertices Xo ∪ Zb (respectively, Xb ∪ Zo) is at least ρ. Notice that this immediately
implies the theorem statement.
In the rest of the proof, without loss of generality, we prove that the average utility of the
agents that occupy the vertices in Xo∪Zb is at least ρ. First of all, we observe that the utility of
each agent in NX is in the set { `∆ | ` = 0, . . . ,∆}. Let o` be the numbers of orange agents that
occupy the vertices of X and whose utilities are equal to `∆ . Similarly, let b` be the numbers
of orange agents that occupy the vertices of NX and whose utilities are equal to
`
∆ . Since
we are interested to the orange agents occupying the vertices of Xo, we consider the values o`
such that `∆ < ρ, or, equivalently, ` ≤ α − 1. Similarly, since we are interested to the blue
agents occupying the vertices of Zb, we consider the values b∆−`−1 such that ∆−`−1∆ > ρ, or,
equivalently, ` ≤ α− 1. We prove that, for every 0 ≤ h ≤ α− 1,
h∑
`=0
(`+ 1)b∆−`−1 ≥
h∑
`=0
(∆− `)o`. (7)
We observe that if any orange agent i that occupies a vertex v ∈ Xo has a utility of `∆ , where
0 ≤ ` ≤ α − 1, then, since we are in a local swap equilibrium, any of the ∆ − ` blue agents
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that occupy the vertices in Nv has a utility of at least
∆−`−1
∆ > ρ by Lemma 2.1. This implies
that v has at least ∆ − ` − 1 vertices in its neighborhood that are occupied by blue agents,
and therefore, at most ` + 1 vertices in its neighborhood that are occupied by orange agents.
Let G′ be the (bipartite) subgraph of G containing all the non-monochromatic edges. Consider
the subgraph H of G′ that is induced by the vertices in Xh ⊆ Xo that are occupied by agents
having a utility of at most h∆ and the agents in Zh ⊆ Zb having a utility of at least ∆−h−1∆ .
By construction, the degree of a vertex of Xh occupied by an agent of utility equal to
`
∆ , with
` ≤ h, is equal to ∆− `. Therefore, if δv(H) denotes the degree of v in H, we have that
|E(H)| =
∑
v∈Xh
δv(H) =
h∑
`=0
(∆− `)o`. (8)
Since the degree in H of each vertex in Zh that is occupied by a blue agent whose utility is
equal to ∆−`−1∆ , with ` ≤ h, is upper bounded by `+ 1, we have that
|E(H)| ≤
∑
v∈Zh
δv(H) =
h∑
`=0
(`+ 1)b∆−`−1. (9)
Combining (8) with (9) gives (7). We are now able to compute the average utility with respect
to the agents occupying the vertices in Xo ∪ Zb. The average utility of such agents equals
Uavg :=
∑α−1
`=0
(
∆−`−1
∆ b∆−`−1
)
+
∑α−1
`=0
(
`
∆o`
)∑α−1
`=0 b∆−`−1 +
∑α−1
`=0 o`
.
Now we prove that Uavg ≥ ρ. We assume that the values of all the o`’s are fixed and that there
is at least one o`, with 0 ≤ ` ≤ α − 1, that is strictly greater than 0. Since `∆ < ρ, while
∆−`−1
∆ > ρ, we have that Uavg is minimized when the values we can assign to the b∆−`−1’s –
that must satisfy (7) for every 0 ≤ h ≤ α− 1 – are somehow minimized.
Since, for every ` < `′ and every 0 <  < b∆−`′−1,
∆− `− 1
∆
>
∆− `′ − 1
∆
as well as
(`′ + 1)(b∆−`−1 + ) + (`+ 1)(b∆−`′−1 − ) > (`′ + 1)b∆−`−1 + (`+ 1)b∆−`′−1,
we have that Uavg is minimized exactly when b∆−`−1 = ∆−``+1 o`.
2 Therefore, if we denote by
Ψ = {` | 0 ≤ ` ≤ α− 1 ∧ o` > 0}, we have that
Uavg ≥
∑
`∈Ψ
(
(∆−`−1)(∆−`)
∆(`+1) o`
)
+
∑
`∈Ψ
(
`
∆o`
)
∑
`∈Ψ
(
∆−`
`+1 o`
)
+
∑
`∈Ψ o`
=
∑
`∈Ψ
2`2−2(∆−1)`+∆(∆−1)
∆(`+1)∑
`∈Ψ
∆+1
`+1
≥ min
`∈Ψ
2`2 − 2(∆− 1)`+ ∆(∆− 1)
∆(∆ + 1)
.
We complete the proof by showing that
min
`∈Ψ
2`2 − 2(∆− 1)`+ ∆(∆− 1)
∆(∆ + 1)
≥ ρ. (10)
2We are relaxing the constraint that b∆−`−1 must be an integer.
25
The numerator of the left-hand side of (10) is a parabola with respect to the variable ` and is
therefore minimized when ` is chosen as closest as possible to the value ∆−12 .
As
⌊
∆−1
2
⌋ ≥ α−1 and ` ≤ α−1, if follows that the value of ` that minimizes (10) is ` = α−1.
Therefore,
2(α− 1)2 − 2(2α− 1)(α− 1) + 2α(2α− 1)
2α(2α+ 1)
= ρ.
Hence, Uavg ≥ ρ.
Corollary 3.9 The LPoA of local 2-SSG on a regular graph G with ∆(G) = 2α+β, with α ≥ 1
and β ∈ {0, 1} is at most 2 + 1α .
Proof: The corollary follows from Lemma 3.8 by X = V .
The matching lower bound is provided in the following.
Theorem 3.10 The LPoA of local 2-SSG on a regular graph G with ∆(G) = 2α + β, with
α ≥ 1 and β ∈ {0, 1} is equal to 2 + 1α .
Proof: For a fixed degree ∆ ≥ 3, we define the ∆-regular graph G(∆) := G as follows. There
are q := t(∆ + 1) gadgets G1, . . . , Gq. For each i ∈ [q], gadget Gi is obtained from a complete
graph of ∆ + 1 vertices, denoted as v10, . . . , v
i
∆, by removing edge {vi0, vi∆}. Observe that, by
construction, for any i ∈ [q], each vertex vij , with 1 ≤ j ≤ ∆− 1, has degree ∆, while vertices vi0
and vi∆ have degree ∆− 1. We obtain G by connecting the q gadgets through edges {vi∆, vi+10 }
for each i ∈ [q−1] and edge {vq∆, v10}. Call these edges extra-gadget edges. Thus, G is connected
and ∆-regular. Consider now the local 2-SSG played on G in which there are d∆+12 eq blue
agents and b∆+12 cq orange ones.
On the one hand, the social optimum is at least n− 4∆ = q(∆ + 1)− 4∆, as in the strategy
profile in which all vertices of the first d∆+12 et gadgets are colored blue and all vertices of the
remaining b∆+12 ct gadgets are colored orange there are n − 4 vertices getting utility 1 and 4
vertices getting utility ∆−1∆ .
On the other hand, the strategy profile σ in which the first d∆+12 e vertices of each gadget
are colored blue and the remaining ones are colored orange is a swap equilibrium. In fact, as
extra-gadget edges connect vertices of different colors, every blue vertex is adjacent to d∆+12 e−1
blue ones, while every orange vertex is adjacent to d∆+12 e blue ones. If a blue vertex swaps with
an adjacent orange one, it ends up being adjacent to d∆+12 e−1 blue vertices. Thus, no profitable
swap exists in σ.
As the social welfare of σ is
q
∆
(⌈
∆ + 1
2
⌉(⌈
∆ + 1
2
⌉
− 1
)
+
⌊
∆ + 1
2
⌋(⌊
∆ + 1
2
⌋
− 1
))
=
{
q(∆2−1)
2∆ if q is odd,
q∆
2 if q is even,
we get that the LPoA of the game is lower bounded by 2∆(q(∆+1)−4∆)
q(∆2−1) when ∆ is odd and by
2(q(∆+1)−4∆)
q∆ when ∆ is even. By letting q going to infinity, we get
2∆
∆−1 and
2(∆+1)
∆ , respectively.
By using ∆ = 2α+1 in the first case, and ∆ = 2α in the second one, we finally obtain the lower
bound of 2 + 1α .
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3.3 Paths and Cycles
In this section we provide upper and lower bounds for the (L)PoA of paths and cycles. We first
provide a full characterization of the PoA for cycles.
Theorem 3.11 The PoA of 2-SSGs played on cycles with n ≥ 3 vertices and o = 2α+β orange
agents, where α ∈ N, β ∈ {0, 1}, and b ≥ o, is equal to
PoA =
{
1 if o = 1;
n−2
b+β otherwise.
Proof: The social welfare of the social optimum is clearly equal to n− 2 and is attained when
the cycle contains one path whose vertices are all occupied by the b blue agents and another
path whose vertices are all occupied by the o orange agents. Now we prove matching upper and
lower bounds for all the cases.
When o = 1 we clearly have that any strategy profile is a swap equilibrium because the
unique orange agent always has a utility of 0, the two blue agents that occupy the vertices
adjacent to the vertex occupied by the orange agent have a utility of 12 each, and the remaining
b− 2 blue agents all have a utility of 1. Therefore, the social welfare is equal to n− 2, and the
claim follows.
Let σ be a swap equilibrium. Let ` be the number of maximal vertex-induced (sub)paths
whose vertices are occupied by orange agents only. Clearly, ` is also the number of maximal
vertex-induced (sub)paths whose vertices are occupied by blue agents only. We claim that
` ≤ α by showing that every agent has a strictly positive utility in σ (i.e., each of the 2`
maximal paths formed by monochromatic edges contains 2 or more vertices). Indeed, for the
sake of contradiction, assume without loss of generality that there is an orange agent i such
that Ui(σ) = 0. This implies that there must be a blue agent j that occupies a vertex v such
that v is not adjacent to the vertex occupied by i and v is adjacent to a vertex occupied by an
orange agent i′ 6= i. As a consequence, Uj(σ) ≤ 12 . In this case, swapping i with j would be an
improving move since ui(σij) > 0 = ui(σ) and 1 = uj(σij) >
1
2 ≥ uj(σ), thus contradicting the
fact that σ is a swap equilibrium.
As a consequence the utility of 2` orange agents is equal to 12 , while the utility of the other
o − 2` = n − b − 2` orange agents is equal to 1; similarly, the utility of 2` blue agents is equal
to 12 , while the utility of the other b− 2` blue agents is equal to 1. Therefore, the social cost is
at least
1
2
(2`+ 2`) + (n− b− 2`) + (b− 2`) = n− 2` ≥ n− 2α = b+ β.
The upper bound to the PoA follows.
For the matching lower bound, it is enough to consider the strategy profile in which ` = α,
i.e., there are α−1 maximal vertex-induced paths occupied by orange (respectively, blue) agents
only of length 2 each, and one maximal vertex-induced path occupied by orange (respectively,
blue) agents only of length 2 + β (respectively, b − 2α + 2). In this case, the social welfare is
exactly equal to
1
2
2α+ β +
1
2
α+ (b− 2α) = b+ β.
The following theorem provides almost tight upper bounds to the LPoA for cycles.
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Theorem 3.12 The LPoA of local 2-SSGs played on cycles with n = 3α+β vertices and b blue
agents, where α ∈ N, β ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and b ≥ o, is upper bounded by
LPoA ≤

1 if o = 1;
n−2
b−o if o ≥ 2 and b ≥ 2o;
n−2
α+β otherwise (i.e., o ≥ 2 and b < 2o).
The upper bounds are tight when (i) o = 1 and (ii) o ≥ 2 and b ≥ 2o.
Proof: The social welfare of the social optimum is equal to n − 2. Now, we prove matching
upper and lower bounds for all cases.
When o = 1, any configuration is a (local) swap equilibrium; therefore the social welfare is
equal to n− 2 and the claim follows.
Now, we consider the case in which o ≥ 2. Let oh and bh be the numbers of orange
and blue agents having a utility equal to h ∈ {0, 12 , 1}, respectively. Every configuration can
be decomposed into maximal vertex-induced paths whose vertices are all occupied by agents
of the same type. Furthermore, if ` is the overall number of these maximal vertex-induced
paths whose vertices are all occupied by orange agents, then ` is also the overall number of
maximal vertex-induced paths whose vertices are all occupied by blue agents. This implies that
that o 1
2
= 2(` − o0) and b 1
2
= 2(` − b0). Therefore, o = o0 + o 1
2
+ o1 = 2` − o0 + o1 and
b = b0 + b 1
2
+ b1 = 2` − b0 + b1, i.e., o1 = o − 2` + o0 and b1 = b − 2` + b0. As a consequence,
using the fact that b + o = n, the social welfare is equal to
∑
h∈{0, 1
2
,1} hoh +
∑
h∈{0, 1
2
,1} hbh =
`− o0 + o− 2`+ o0 + `− b0 + b− 2`+ b0 = n− 2`. We observe that each orange agent of utility 0
occupies a vertex that is adjacent to two vertices occupied by blue agents having a utility of 12
each. As a consequence, b 1
2
= 2(`− b0) ≥ 2o0, or, equivalently, ` ≥ b0 +o0. Therefore, the social
welfare is minimized exactly when ` is maximized, as shown by the following ILP (where the
second and third constraints are of the form o0 + o 1
2
≤ o and b0 + b 1
2
≤ b, respectively):
maximize `
subject to b0 + o0 ≤ `
2`− o0 ≤ o
2`− b0 ≤ b
`, b0, o0 ∈ N.
Combining the first 3 inequalities we obtain 2`+2` ≤ o+o0+b+b0 ≤ n+`, from which we derive
` ≤ bn3 c = α. Furthermore, since o0 ≤ ` we have that ` ≤ 2` − o0 ≤ o. Therefore, the value of
an optimum solution is upper bounded by ` = min{o, α}. If b ≥ 2o, then setting `, o0 = o and
all other variables to 0 is an optimal solution. If b < 2o, then setting ` = α, o0 = 2α − o, and
b0 = 2α− b is an optimal solution. The upper bound to the LPoA follows.
For the matching lower bound when o ≥ 2 and b ≥ 2o, it is enough to consider the strategy
profile in which ` = o, i.e., each orange agent occupies a vertex that is adjacent to vertices
occupied by blue agents only. As a consequence, the o orange agents have a utility of 0, the 2o
blue agents have a utility of 12 each, while the remaining b− 2o = n− 3o ≥ 0 blue agents have a
utility of 1 each. The social welfare in this case is exactly equal to 12o+n− 3o = n− 2o = b− o.
We now prove similar results for paths.
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Theorem 3.13 The PoA of 2-SSGs played on paths with n ≥ 3 vertices and o = 2α+β orange
agents, where α ∈ N, β ∈ {0, 1}, and b ≥ o, is equal to
PoA =

+∞ if n = 3;
2n−2
2n−5 if n > 3 and o = 1;
n−1
b+1+β if n > 3, o ≥ 2 and b ≤ 2α+ 1;
n−1
b+β otherwise (i.e., o ≥ 2 and b ≥ 2α+ 2).
Proof: For n ≥ 4, the social welfare of the social optimum is clearly equal to n − 1 and
is attained when the path contains a subpath whose vertices are all occupied by the b blue
agents and one subpath whose vertices are all occupied by the o orange agents. For n = 3, the
social welfare of the social optimum is clearly equal to 32 and is attained when the orange agent
occupies one endvertex of the path. Now we prove matching upper and lower bounds for all the
cases.
When o = 1, we clearly have that any strategy profile is a swap equilibrium. The strategy
profile with minimum social welfare is when the orange agent occupies a vertex that is adjacent
to an endvertex of the path. In this case, the blue agent that occupies such an endvertex has
a utility of 0, the orange agent has a utility of 0, the other blue agent that is adjacent to the
vertex occupied by the orange agent has a utility of 0, if n = 3, and of 12 , if n ≥ 4, while all the
other blue agents (if any) have a utility of 1 each. Therefore, for n = 3 the social welfare is 0,
while for n ≥ 4, the social welfare is equal to n− 52 , and the claim follows.
Therefore, we are only left to prove the bounds to the PoA when n > 3 and o ≥ 2. Let σ be
a swap equilibrium. We first show that every agent has a strictly positive utility in σ. Indeed,
for the sake of contradiction, assume without loss of generality that there is an orange agent i
such that Ui(σ) = 0. This implies that there must be a blue agent j that occupies a vertex v
such that v is not adjacent to the vertex occupied by i and v is adjacent to a vertex occupied by
an orange agent i′ 6= i. As a consequence, Uj(σ) ≤ 12 . In this case, swapping i with j would be
an improving move since ui(σij) > 0 = ui(σ) and 1 = uj(σij) >
1
2 ≥ uj(σ), thus contradicting
the fact that σ is a local swap equilibrium.
Let ` be the number of maximal vertex-induced (sub)paths whose vertices are all occupied
by the orange agents. Since every orange agents has strictly positive utility, it follows that ` ≤ α.
Let x and y be the number of orange and blue agents that occupy the endvertices of the path,
respectively. Clearly x + y = 2. Let `′ be the number of maximal vertex-induced (sub)paths
whose vertices are all occupied by the blue agents. We have that `′ ≤ ` + 1. Furthermore, the
utility of 2`− x orange agents is 12 while the utility of the other o− 2` + x orange agents is 1;
similarly, the utility of 2`′ − y blue agents is 12 , while the utility of the other b − 2`′ + y blue
agents is 1. Therefore, the social welfare is at least
1
2
(2`− x+ 2`′ − y) + (o− 2`+ x) + (b− 2`′ + y) = n+ 1
2
(x+ y)− `− `′ ≥ n+ 1− `− `′.
If b ≤ 2α+ 1, then `′ ≤ α and therefore n+ 1− `− `′ ≥ n+ 1− 2α = b+ 1 + β.
If b ≥ 2α+ 2, then `′ ≤ `+ 1 and therefore n+ 1− `− `′ ≥ n− 2α = b+ β.
For the matching lower bound, consider the strategy profile that induces ` = α maximal
vertex-induced paths occupied by orange agents only and `′ maximal vertex-induced paths that
are occupied by blue agents only, where `′ = α if b ≤ 2α + 1 and to `′ + 1 otherwise. In this
case, the social welfare is exactly equal to b+ 1 + β if b ≤ 2α+ 1 and b+ β, otherwise.
Theorem 3.14 The LPoA of local 2-SSGs played on paths with n = 3α+β vertices and b blue
29
agents, where α ∈ N, β ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and b ≥ o, is upper bounded by
LPoA ≤

+∞ if n = 3;
2n−2
2n−5 if n > 3 and o = 1;
n−1
b−o−1 if n > 3, o ≥ 2, b ≥ 2o;
n−1
α otherwise (i.e., n > 3, o ≥ 2 and b < 2o).
The upper bounds are tight when (i) n = 3, (ii) n > 3 and o = 1, and (iii) n > 3, o ≥ 2, b ≥ 2o.
Proof: As shown in Theorem 3.13, the social welfare of the social optimum is equal to n− 1.
Furthermore, both the upper and lower bounds to the PoA proved in Theorem 3.13 for n = 3
as well as for n > 3 and o = 1 also hold for the LPoA. Therefore, in the rest of the proof we
assume that n ≥ 4 and o ≥ 2.
Let or and br be the numbers of orange and blue agents having a utility equal to r ∈
{0, 12 , 1}, respectively. Let ` (respectively, `′) be the overall number of maximal vertex-induced
paths whose vertices are all occupied by orange (respectively, blue) agents. We observe that
`− 1 ≤ `′ ≤ `+ 1. Let xr (respectively, yr) be the number of orange (respectively, blue) agents
that occupy the endvertices of the path and whose utility is equal to r ∈ {0, 1}. We have that
x0 + x1 + y0 + y1 = 2. Furthermore, we have that o 1
2
= 2(`− o0)− x1 and b 1
2
= 2(`′ − b0)− y1.
Therefore,
o = o0 + o 1
2
+ o1 = 2`− o0 − x1 + o1
and
b = b0 + b 1
2
+ b1 = 2`
′ − b0 − y1 + b1,
i.e., o1 = o − 2` + o0 + x1 and b1 = b − 2`′ + b0 + y1. As a consequence, the social welfare is
equal to∑
h∈{0, 1
2
,1}
hrh +
∑
h∈{0, 1
2
,1}
hbh = `− o0 − 1
2
x1 + o− 2`+ o0 + x1 + `′ − b0 − 1
2
y1 + b− 2`′ + b0 + y1
= n− `− `′ + 1
2
x1 +
1
2
y1.
Now, observe that each orange (respectively, blue) agent that has a utility of 0 and occupies
neither an endvertex of the path nor its adjacent vertex is adjacent to two blue (respectively,
orange) agents of utility equal to 12 each. Therefore b 12
= 2(`′ − b0) − y1 ≥ 2(o0 − x0) as
well as o 1
2
= 2(` − o0) − x1 ≥ 2(b0 − y0), or, equivalently, `′ ≥ b0 + o0 − x0 + 12y1 as well as
` ≥ b0 + o0 − y0 + 12x1. Therefore, to minimize the social welfare we need to solve the following
ILP.
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maximize `+ `′ − 1
2
x1 − 1
2
y1
subject to b0 + o0 − y0 + 1
2
x1 ≤ `
b0 + o0 − x0 + 1
2
y1 ≤ `′
2`− o0 − x1 ≤ o
2`′ − b0 − y1 ≤ b
x0 + x1 + y0 + y1 = 2
x0 ≤ o0
y0 ≤ b0
`′ ≤ `+ 1
` ≤ `′ + 1
`, `′, x0, x1, y0, y1, b0, o0 ∈ N.
Combining the first 4 inequalities of the ILP we obtain
2`+ 2` ≤ o+ o0 + x1 + b+ b0 + y1 ≤ n+ 1
2
`+
1
2
y0 − 3
4
y1 +
1
2
`′ +
1
2
x0 − 3
4
x1,
from which we derive
`+ `′ − 1
2
(x1 + y1) ≤ 2
3
n+
1
3
(x0 + y0) = 2α+
2
3
β +
2
3
− 1
3
(x1 + y1).
By considering the constraints 0 ≤ x1 + y1 ≤ 2 and the fact that x1, y1, ` and `′ are all non
negative integers, it turns out that the above inequality is maximized exactly when x1 + y1 = 0
or, equivalently, x1, y1 = 0, and therefore, ` + `
′ ≤ ⌊2α+ 23β + 23⌋ = 2α + β. Furthermore,
combining the seventh inequality of the ILP with the first one, we obtain o0 ≤ ` and therefore,
using the third inequality of the ILP, we obtain that ` ≤ o. Since the eighth inequality implies
that `′ ≤ ` + 1 ≤ o + 1, we have that the value ` + `′ ≤ 2o + 1. As a consequence the value of
an optimum solution is upper bounded by
min {2o+ 1, 2α+ β} .
We now divide the proof into two cases:
Case 1: b ≥ 2o. Setting `, o0 = o, `′ = o + 1, y0, b0 = 2, and all the remaining variables
to 0 gives an optimum solution for the ILP and the corresponding value of the objective
function matches the upper bound of 2o + 1. Therefore, the social welfare is at least
n− 2o− 1 = b− o− 1 and the upper bound to the LPoA follows. Furthermore, this upper
bound is tight. Indeed, consider the strategy profile in which each orange agent occupies a
vertex that is adjacent to two vertices occupied by blue agents only and two orange agents
occupy the second and last but one vertex of the path (i.e., the two vertices adjacent to
the path endvertices). Observe that there are exactly 2(o− 1) blue agents having a utility
equal to 12 and 2 agents having a utility of 0 (thus b− 2(o− 1)− 2 agents having a utility
of 1). The social welfare of this configuration is equal to 122(o− 1) + (b− 2(o− 1)− 2) =
o− 1 + b− 2o = b− o− 1.
Case 2: b < 2o. The optimum value of the ILP is upper bounded by 2α+ β. Hence, the social
welfare is at least n− 2α− β = α, and the upper bound to the LPoA follows.
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3.4 Grids
We now turn our focus to grid graphs with 4- and 8-neighbors. Remember that grids are formed
by a two-dimensional lattice. Hence, we can partition the vertices of an l× h grid G into three
sets: corner vertices, border vertices and middle vertices, denoted, respectively, as C(G), B(G),
and M(G). We have C(G) = {vi,j : i ∈ {1, n} and j ∈ {1,m}}, B(G) = {vi,j : i ∈ {1, n} or j ∈
{1,m}} \ C(G) and M(G) = V (G) \ (C(G) ∪B(G)).
First, we focus on 2-SSGs in 4-grids and start by characterizing the PoA for the case in
which one type has a unique representative.
Theorem 3.15 The PoA of 2-SSGs played on a 4-grid in which one type has cardinality 1 is
equal to 2522 .
Proof: Assume, without loss of generality, that orange is the type with a unique representative.
For this game, any strategy profile σ is an equilibrium, since in any profile, the orange vertex o
gets utility zero, the vertices not adjacent to o get utility 1, while all vertices adjacent to o
get less than 1. Call these last vertices the penalized vertices. Thus, the PoA is maximized by
comparing the social welfare of the strategy profile minimizing the overall loss of the penalized
vertices with the one of the strategy profile maximizing it. It is easy to see that the overall loss
of the penalized vertices is minimized when o is a corner vertices, while it is maximized when o
is a border one in a 4-grid with l = 2 and h = 3. Comparing the two social welfares gives the
claimed bound.
Clearly, if one type has only one representative, this agent will receive utility zero. However,
this is not possible in equilibrium assignments when there are at least two agents of each type.
Lemma 3.16 In any equilibrium for a 2-SSG played on a 4-grid in which both types have
cardinality larger than 1 all agents get positive utility.
Proof: Fix an equilibrium σ for a game satisfying the premises of the lemma. Let i be a
vertex such that Ui(σ) = 0 and assume, without loss of generality, that i is orange. This implies
that i is surrounded by blue vertices only.
Pick another orange vertex j 6= i which is adjacent to at least a blue one `. If ` /∈ \Ni(G),
it follows that i and ` can perform a profitable swap contradicting the assumption that σ is an
equilibrium. Thus, ` has to belong to Ni(G). Let us now consider two cases.
If i occupies a corner vertex, ` needs to be placed on a border one. So, as ` is adjacent to
i and j, it holds that U`(σ) ≤ 13 . Thus, as we have U`(σi`) = 12 and Ui(σi`) > 0, i and ` can
perform a profitable swap contradicting the assumption that σ is an equilibrium.
If i is not located on a corner vertex, as ` is adjacent to i and j, it holds that U`(σ) ≤ 12 .
Moreover, |Ni(G)| ≥ 3 which yields U`(σi`) = |Ni(G)|−1|Ni(G)| ≥ 23 . Thus, also in this case, i and ` can
perform a profitable swap contradicting the assumption that σ is an equilibrium.
When no agent gets utility zero, the minimum possible utility is 14 . Thus, Lemmas 3.15 and 3.16
together imply an upper bound of 4 on the PoA. However, a much better result can be shown.
Theorem 3.17 The PoA of 2-SSGs played on 4-grids is at most 2.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we consider an l × h grid, with l ≤ h. When l = 1, the
PoA of 2 follows from Theorem 3.13. Therefore, we assume that l, h ≥ 2. Furthermore, by
Lemma 3.15, we only need to consider the case in which there are at least two agents per type.
By Lemma 3.16, we know that, in this case, the utility of each agent is strictly positive. We
prove the claim by showing that the average utility of an agent is at least 12 . We divide the
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?(c)(b)(a)
Figure 15: The unique swap equilibrium for 2 × 3 4-grids is shown in (a). Indeed, in (b) the
blue agent in v1,1 can swap with the orange agent in v2,2, while in (c) the blue agent in v1,1
can swap with the orange agent in v1,2 (the question mark in v2,3 means that the vertex can be
occupied by an agent of any type).
proof into two cases, depending on the utilities of the middle agents (i.e., agents occupying the
middle vertices).
Case 1. In the first case, we assume that the utility of every middle agent is at least 12 . As
corner agents (i.e., agents occupying corner vertices) have a utility of at least 12 each, we only
need to prove the claim when there is at least one border agent (i.e., an agent occupying a border
vertex) whose utility is equal to 13 . This implies that l + h ≥ 5. Without loss of generality,
we assume that there are more orange than blue agents having a utility equal to 13 . Let I be
the border vertices occupied by the orange (border) agents having a utility of 13 . As the overall
number of border vertices is 2(l−2)+2(h−2) = 2l+2h−8, we have that the number of border
agents having a utility greater than or equal to 23 is at least 2l + 2h − 8 − 2|I|. Therefore, if
|I| = 1 and l + h ≥ 6, then 2l + 2h − 8 − 2|I| ≥ 12 − 8 − 2 = 2; hence, the average utility of
an agent is greater than or equal to 12 . If |I| = 1 and l + h = 5, then the only configuration in
which a swap equilibrium exists, unless of symmetries, is shown in Figure 15(a).
We observe that, in such configuration, the average utility of an agent is strictly greater
than 12 . It remains to prove the case in which |I| ≥ 2. Since σ is a swap equilibrium, the utility
of a blue agent that occupies a vertex that is not adjacent to all the vertices in I is at least 23 .
As each blue agent occupies a vertex that is adjacent to at most 2 vertices in I and because each
vertex in I is adjacent to exactly 2 vertices occupied by blue agents, the number of blue agents
is at least 2|I|/2 = |I|. Therefore, if we assume that every blue agent has a utility of at least 23 ,
then the average utility of an agent would be at least 12 . We observe that this assumption holds
when either (a) |I| ≥ 3 (because there is no blue agent occupying a vertex that is adjacent to
all the vertices of I) or (b) |I| = 2 and the two vertices of I are either at t-hop distance from
each other, with t ≥ 2, or they are are at 2-hop distance from each other and the utility of the
border agent that occupies the vertex in between is at least 23 . For the remaining case in which
|I| = 2, the two vertices of I are at 2-hop distance from each other, and the agent occupying
the border vertex in between is equal to 13 – and thus is of blue type – we simply observe that
the overall number of blue agents is at least 4. Indeed, without loss of generality, let v1,x−1
and v1,x+1 be the two vertices of I. As v1,x is occupied by a blue agent that has strictly positive
utility, v2,x is also occupied by a blue agent. Furthermore, either v1,x−2 or v2,x−1 is occupied by
a blue agent. Similarly, either v1,x+2 or v2,x+1 is occupied by a blue agent. Therefore, there are
at least 4 blue agents. Since 3 out of these 4 blue agents have a utility of at least 23 , again, the
average utility of an agent is at least 12 .
Case 2. In the second case, we assume that there is at least an agent occupying a middle
vertex and whose utility is equal to 14 . Without loss of generality, we assume that there are
more orange than blue agents having a utility equal to 14 . Let I be the vertices of the orange
agents having a utility of 14 . We prove that
(i) every blue agent has a utility of at least 12 ;
(ii) the number of blue agent having utility greater than or equal to 34 is at least |I|;
(iii) all border and corner agents are of blue type.
This would clearly imply that the average utility of an agent is 12 since the utility of border
and corner agents would be at least 23 .
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Let vx,y be a vertex of I and, without loss of generality, we assume that vx,y−1, vx−1,y,
and vx,y+1 are occupied by blue agents whose utilities are greater than or equal to
1
2 . Similarly,
we can prove that the utility of every other blue agent that occupies a vertex that is not
adjacent to all vertices in I is at least 34 . This implies that at least one vertex between vx−1,y−1
and vx−1,y+1 is occupied by a blue agent whose utility is greater than or equal to 34 ; similarly,
at least one vertex between vx+1,y−1 and vx+1,y+1 is occupied by a blue agent whose utility is
greater than or equal to 34 . Therefore, we have proved (ii) for the case in which |I| ≤ 2. To
prove (ii) when |I| > 2, it is enough to observe that all blue agents have a utility greater than
or equal to 34 because none of them occupies a vertex that is adjacent to all the vertices in I.
But this implies that each blue agent of utility of at least 34 occupies a vertex that is adjacent
to at most one vertex in I. Hence, the overall number of blue agents is at least |I|.
We now conclude the proof by proving (iii). First of all, we prove that at least one border
or corner vertex is occupied by a blue agent. For the sake of contradiction, we assume that all
border and corner vertices are occupied by the orange agents. Let vx,y be the leftmost-topmost
vertex occupied by a blue agent, i.e., both vx,y−1 and vx−1,y are occupied by orange agents and
there is no other vertex vx′,y′ occupied by a blue agent such that x
′ < x or x = x′ and y′ < y. We
observe that such a vertex always exists because x, y > 1 and that vx−1,y−1 must be occupied
by an orange agent. Furthermore, by the choice of vx,y, the utility of the two orange agents
that occupy the vertices vx−1,y and vx,y−1 must be at least 12 . Since the utility of the blue agent
occupying the vertex vx,y has to be at least
1
2 , vx+1,y and vx,y+1 are occupied by blue agents.
As a consequence, Nvx,y ∩ I = ∅. Therefore, swapping the agent that occupies vx,y with any
agent occupying a vertex in I would be an improving move. Now that we know that at least one
border or corner agent is of blue type, we prove that all of them must be of blue type. For the
sake of contradiction assume that at least one border or corner vertex is occupied by an orange
agent. Without loss of generality, let v1,y be a vertex occupied by an orange agent such that
v1,y+1 is occupied by a blue agent. Since the utility of such a blue agent is at least
1
2 , the unique
middle vertex adjacent to v1,y+1, i.e., v2,y+1, must be occupied by a blue agent. This implies
that v1,y+1 cannot be adjacent to any vertex in I. As the utility of the agent occupying vertex
v1,y+1 is at most
2
3 , swapping the agent occupying the vertex v1,j+1 and any agent occupying a
vertex in I would be an improving move. This completes the proof.
The following lemma gives a sufficient condition for a strategy profile to be an equilibrium.
Lemma 3.18 Fix a 2-SSG played on a 4-grid. Any strategy profile in which corner and middle
vertices get utility at least 12 and border ones get utility at least
2
3 is an equilibrium.
Proof: Fix a strategy profile σ meeting the premises of the claim and two vertices i and j of
different color in σ. As Ui(σ) ≥ 12 and Uj(σ) ≥ 12 , it can only be Ui(σij) ≤ 12 thus implying
that no profitable swaps are possible in σ.
We now show a matching lower bound.
Theorem 3.19 The PoA of 2-SSGs played on 4-grids is at least 2, even when both types have
the same cardinality.
Proof: Fix a 2-SSG played on an n × n grid G, with n being an even number. We define a
strategy profile σ by giving a coloring rule for any frame of G. Clearly, being n an even number,
there are n2 frames in G that we number from 1 to
n
2 , with frame 1 corresponding to the outer
one, i.e., the biggest. Frame i, whose size is ni := n− 2(i− 1), is colored as follows: all vertices
in the left column and all vertices in the right column except for the first and the last are of the
basic color of i, all other vertices (that are the ones on the upper and lower rows except for the
vertices falling along the left column) take the other color. Observe that ni +ni− 2 = 2(ni− 1)
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Figure 16: Visualization of the first three frames of G with the coloring induced by the strategy
profile defined in the proof of Theorem 3.19.
vertices take the basic color of i and 2(ni − 1) vertices take the other one, so that every frame
evenly splits its vertices between the two colors. Thus, σ is a well-defined strategy profile for a
2-SSG with both types having the same cardinality. The basic color of frame i is orange if i is
odd and blue otherwise, see Figure 16 for a pictorial example. To show that σ is an equilibrium,
it suffices proving that it satisfies the premises of Lemma 3.18.
To address corner and border vertices, consider frame 1, see again Figure 16. It comes by
construction that every corner vertices gets utility 12 and that every border vertices gets utility
at least 23 , except for vertices (1, 2), (2, n), (n−1, n) and (n, 2) for which further investigation is
needed. In particular, they get utility 23 if and only if the following coloring holds: (2, 2) is blue,
(2, n − 1) is orange, (n − 1, n − 1) is orange and (n − 1, 2) is blue. This holds by construction
and can be verified by a direct inspection of Figure 16.
To address middle vertices, it suffices proving that, any vertex belonging to frame i > 1 has
two orange and two blue neighbors Let c denote the basic color of frame i and c be the other
color. Consider a generic vertex v belonging to frame i. By inspecting all possible positions of v
within the frame as shown in Figure 17, it can be easily verified that the desired property holds.
By Lemma 3.18, σ is an equilibrium.
Figure 17: Visualization of the neighborhood of vertices belonging to a frame i > 1. The target
vertices are the ones included in the box. On the left, vertices belonging to the left column; on
the right, vertices belonging to the right column; on the center, vertices belonging to a row but
not to a column.
We now show matching upper and lower bounds on the LPoA for local 2-SSGs played on grids.
By inspecting all the possibilities, the LPoA of local 2-SSGs played on 2× 2 grids is 1. Indeed,
assuming b ≥ o, for o = 1, all the configurations are isomorphic to each other, while, for o = 2,
the unique (local) swap equilibrium – up to isomorphisms – is
[
o b
o b
]
.
Theorem 3.20 The LPoA of local 2-SSGs played on 2×h 4-grids, with h ≥ 3 is 3. Furthermore,
for every  > 0, there is a value h0 such that, for every h ≥ h0, the PoA of 2 × h 4-grid is at
least 3− .
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(b)(a) (c)
Figure 18: The local swap equilibrium with largest social welfare is shown in (a) and the social
optimum is shown in (b). (c) shows the unique local swap equilibrium which contains an agent
with utility 0.
Proof: For the lower bound consider the strategy profile in which h is a multiple of 6, o = b,
odd columns are filled with orange agents, and even column are filled with blue agents (see
Figure 18(a) for an example on a 2× 6 4-grid). The strategy profile is a local swap equilibrium
and the corresponding social welfare is equal to 13(n− 4) + 2 = n+23 . A social optimum having
social welfare of n− 43 = 3n−43 is the strategy profile in which all the orange agents occupy the
first h2 columns, and the blue agents occupy the last
h
2 columns (see Figure 18(b) for an example
on a 2× 6 4-grid). Therefore, for every h ≥ 5− , we have that the following formula is a lower
bound to the LPoA
3n− 4
n+ 2
= 3− 10
n+ 2
= 3− 5
h+ 1
≥ 3− .
To prove the upper bound of 3, we show that the average utility of an agent is at least 13 . We
consider only the agents that have a utility of 0 since all the others have a utility of at least 13
each. When h is equal to 2, the unique strategy profile (unless of symmetries) that is in local
swap equilibrium and contains at least one agent that has 0 utility is depicted in Figure 18(c).
However, it is easy to check that the average utility of an agent is 12 . Therefore, we only need to
prove the claim for h ≥ 3. We prove that if x is the number of agents whose utilities are equal
to 0, then there are at least x agents that have a utility of at least 23 each. Indeed, let i be any
agent that has a utility equal to 0. Since σ is a local swap equilibrium and h ≥ 3, there is an
agent j such that
(i) σj ∈ Nσi ,
(ii) the type of i is different from the type of j, and
(iii) Uj(σ) ≥ 23 .
More precisely, (iii) implies that Nv \ {u} contains only vertices occupied by agents of the same
type of j. Therefore, we can uniquely assign an agent j that has a utility of at least 23 to every
agent i that has a utility of 0. The claim follows.
Theorem 3.21 The LPoA of local 2-SSG played on 3 × h 4-grids, with h ≥ 3 is 3613 . Further-
more, for every  > 0, there is a value h0 such that, for every h ≥ h0, the PoA of 2× h 4-grid
is at least 3613 − .
Proof: For the lower bound of 3613 −  consider the strategy profile in Figure 19. The average
utility of the agents that occupy any column from 3 to h− 2 is equal to 1336 .
Now, we prove the upper bound of 3613 . In the rest of the proof, by utility of the r-th column
we mean the overall utility of the agents that occupy the vertices of the r-th column. We show
that the utility of the first (respectively, last) column is of at least 56 and we show that the
average utility of the other columns is at least 1236 .
First of all, we observe that, among the agents that occupy the vertices of the r-th column,
at most one can have a utility of 0. Indeed, if without loss of generality, v1,r and v2,r are
occupied by two agents of utility 0, then by swapping the two agents, they would both have a
strictly positive utility. Moreover, if the two agents having a utility of 0 occupy the vertices v1,r
and v3,r, then by swapping either of the two agents with the agent occupying the vertex v2,r
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Figure 19: The strategy profile inducing an average agent’s utility that can be made arbitrarily
close to 1336 is shown on the left side via a small example (3 × 9 4-grid). On the right side it is
shown a strategy profile inducing an average agent’s utility arbitrarily close to 1.
would be an improving move. This observation implies that the utility of the r-th column, with
r ∈ {1, h}, is lower bounded by 56 .
Now we show that utility of the r-th column, with 2 ≤ r ≤ h−1, is of at least 1312 . We divide
the proof into cases.
In the first case, we assume that the middle agent has a utility of 0. In this case both border
agents of the column would have a utility of at least 23 and therefore, the utility of the r-th
column would be of at least 43 ≥ 1312 .
In the second case, we assume that a border agent has a utility of 0. This implies that the
middle agent has a utility of 34 and the other border agent a utility of at least
1
3 . Therefore, the
utility of the r-th column is at least 1312 .
In the last case, we assume that all agents that occupy the vertices of the r-th column have
a strictly positive utility. We observe that the only interesting case to look at, is when the
border agents both have a utility of 13 and the middle agent has a utility of
1
4 , as in all the
other cases, the utility of the r-th column would be of at least 1312 . In this case, the utility of
at least one between column r − 1 and column r + 1 must be of at least 32 . Indeed, if without
loss of generality, v1,r and v2,r are occupied by orange agents, while v3,r is occupied by a blue
agent, then, due to the agents’ utilities, v1,r−1, v2,r−2, v1,r+1, v2,r+2 are occupied by blue agents,
while one between v3,r−1 and v3,r+1 must be occupied by a blue agent as well. In either case,
one column between column r − 1 and column r + 1 is entirely occupied by blue agents. As
a consequence, for every two columns each of utility equal to 23 +
1
4 =
11
12 , there must be a
column of utility of at least 32 . By averaging among the three considered columns, we obtain
1
3(
11
6 +
3
2) =
10
9 >
13
12 . This completes the proof.
Theorem 3.22 For every  > 0, the LPoA of local 2-SSG played on l × h 4-grids, with `, h ≥
8 + 20 is in the interval
(
5
2 − , 52 + 
]
.
Proof: Let X be the set of middle vertices that are adjacent neither to border nor to corner
vertices. Clearly, NX =
⋃
v∈X Nv is the set of all the middle vertices. Therefore, the degree of
each vertex v ∈ NX is equal to 4. Let Z ⊆ NX be the set of vertices occupied by agents that
have a utility strictly greater than 25 . From Lemma 3.8, we have that the average utility of the
agents in X ∪ Z is at least 25 .
As a consequence, the social welfare is lower bounded by 25 |X ∪ Z| ≥ 25(l − 4)(h − 4) >
2
5 lh− 85(l + h). Therefore, the LPoA can be upper bounded by
lh
2
5 lh− 85(l + h)
=
1
2
5 − 85 l+hlh
≤ 1
2
5 − 85 2(8+20/)(8+20/)2
=
5
2
+ .
For the lower bound, consider the l × h grid, with l = 5l′ + 1 and h = 5h′, that is filled as
shown in Figure 20. The social welfare for arbitrarily large values of l′ and h′ (i.e., l and h)
can be made arbitrarily close to the average utility of the agents that occupy the vertices of
the tiles labeled with T . Observe that 25 is the average utility of the agents that occupy all
the vertices of any tile labeled with T . As the ratio between blue and orange agents can be
made arbitrarily close to 32 , the maximum average utility of an agent is arbitrarily close to 1 by
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Figure 20: The strategy profile inducing an average agent’s utility arbitrarily close to 25 is shown
on the left side via a small example over an 11× 10 4-grid. On the right side, the tiling showing
the pattern we have used for building the instance. The tiles Tc and T
′
c are only used in order
to fill the bottom-left and bottom-right corners of the 4-grid. Observe that using exactly the
same tiles, one can build arbitrarily large instances. Moreover, for arbitrarily large instances,
the average utility of an agent is basically determined by the average utility of the agents that
occupy the vertices of any tile T , i.e., 25 .
placing the orange agents over the vertices of the first 25h columns and the blue agents in the
remaining 35h columns. Therefore, the LPoA is lower bounded by
5
2 − .
We now turn our focus to the 8-grid and first consider the case where one type has only one
agent.
Theorem 3.23 The PoA of 2-SSGs played on an 8-grid in which one type has cardinality 1 is
equal to 897704 .
Proof: Assume without loss of generality that orange is the type with a unique representative.
For this game, any strategy profile σ is an equilibrium, since in any profile σ the orange vertex o
gets utility zero, the vertices not adjacent get utility 1, while all vertices adjacent to o get strictly
less than 1. Call these last vertices the penalized vertices. Thus, the PoA is maximized by
comparing the social welfare of the strategy profile minimizing the overall loss of the penalized
vertices with the once of the strategy profile maximizing it. The overall loss of the penalized
vertices is minimized when o is a corner vertex, while it is maximized when o is a middle one
on an 8-grid with l = h = 3. Comparing the two social welfares gives the claimed bound.
Similar to the 4-grid, if there are at least two agents of each type no agent gets zero utility in
an equilibrium.
Lemma 3.24 In any equilibrium for a 2-SSG played on an 8-grid in which both types have
cardinality larger than 1 all agents get positive utility.
Proof: Fix an equilibrium σ for a game satisfying for a 2-SSG played on an 8-grid. Let i be a
vertex such that Ui(σ) = 0 and assume without loss of generality that i is orange. This implies
that i is surrounded by blue vertices only.
Pick another orange vertex j 6= i which is adjacent to at least one blue agent r. If r /∈ Ni(G),
it follows that i and r can perform a profitable swap contradicting the assumption that σ is an
equilibrium. Thus, r has to belong to Ni(G). We consider two different cases.
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If i is placed on a corner vertex, r needs to be either located at a border or a middle
one. First assume r occupies a border vertex, and since r is adjacent to i and j, it holds that
Ur(σ) ≤ 35 . Thus, as we have Ur(σir) = 23 and Ui(σir) > 0, i and r can perform a profitable
swap contradicting the assumption that σ is an equilibrium. If r occupies a middle vertex, it
holds that Ur(σ) ≤ 68 . So, if Ur(σ) ≤ 58 , i and r can perform a profitable swap since Ur(σir) = 23
and Ui(σir) > 0. If Ur(σ) =
6
8 than l has a blue neighbor r
′ who is not adjacent to i but to j,
hence Ur′(σ) ≤ 78 and therefor i and r′ can perform a profitable swap since Ur′(σir′) = 1 and
Ui(σir′) > 0.
If i is not placed on a corner vertex Ur(σir) =
4
5 . Since Ur(σ) ≤ 68 and Ui(σir) > 0, swapping
i and l is profitable, contradicting the assumption that σ is an equilibrium.
When no agent gets utility zero, the minimum possible utility is 18 . Thus, Lemma 3.24 implies
an upper bound on the PoA.
Theorem 3.25 The PoA of 2-SSGs played on an 8-grid is at most 8.
Proof: The statement follows directly by Lemma 3.24. Every agent gets at least a utility
equals 18 and at most a utility of 1.
We conclude by proving a much better bound for the (L)PoA, if the 8-grid is large enough.
Theorem 3.26 For every  > 0, the LPoA of local 2-SSGs played on an l × h 8-grid, with
l, h ≥ 8 + 18 is at most 94 + .
Proof: Let X be the set of middle vertices that are adjacent neither to border nor to corner
vertices. Clearly, NX =
⋃
v∈X Nv is the set of all the middle vertices. Therefore, the degree
of each vertex v ∈ NX is equal to 8. Let Z ⊆ NX be the set of vertices occupied by agents
that have a utility strictly greater than 49 . From Lemma 3.8, we have that the average utility
of the agents in X ∪ Z is at least 49 . As a consequence, the social welfare is lower bounded by
4
9 |X ∪ Z| ≥ 49(l − 4)(h− 4) > 49 lh− 169 (l + h). Therefore, the LPoA is at most
lh
4
9 lh− 169 (l + h)
=
1
4
9 − 169 l+hlh
≤ 1
4
9 − 169 2(8+18/)(8+18/)2
=
9
4
+ .
4 Conclusion and Open Problems
We have shed light on the influence of the underlying graph topology on the existence of equilib-
ria, the game dynamics and the Price of Anarchy in Swap Schelling Games on graphs. Moreover,
we have studied the impact of restricting agents to local swaps. We present tight or almost tight
bounds for a variety of graph classes.
Clearly, improving on the non-tight bounds is an interesting challenge for future work.
Regarding the local Swap Schelling Game, we leave some interesting problems open. Among
them is the question whether local swap equilibria are guaranteed to exist for all graph classes
and if the local k-SSG always has the finite improvement property. So far, we are not aware
of any counter-examples for both questions and extensive agent-based simulations indicate that
both equilibrium existence and guaranteed convergence of improving response dynamics may
hold. Another interesting line of study is to analyze the Jump Schelling Game with respect to
varying underlying graphs and locality.
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